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WHY IS IT A CRIME TO STOMP ON A GOLDFISH? – 
HARM, VICTIMHOOD AND THE STRUCTURE OF 
ANTI-CRUELTY OFFENSES 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Animal cruelty is considered a crime in all fifty states, the District of 
Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.1 Although the punishment 
for abusing animals differs widely among jurisdictions, all but seven states 
make it a felony offense.2 Some states, like New York, only make it a 
felony if the acts of cruelty are performed on a companion animal.3 Others, 
like Pennsylvania, aggravate punishment if harm is caused to a dog, cat or 
zoo animal.4 The criminalization of cruelty to animals is by no means an 
American phenomenon. Comprehensive anti-cruelty legislation has been 
adopted in many countries, including the United Kingdom, Holland, 
Australia and Argentina, to name a few.  
Even though most countries seem to believe that it is desirable to 
criminalize cruelty to animals, the reasons that justify prohibiting such 
conduct are unclear. Whereas some jurisdictions appear to have been 
                                                 
1 See the Humane Society of the United States fact sheet on state animal cruelty statues as 
of June 2007, in http://www.hsus.org/web-files/PDF/state_cruelty_chart.pdf.  
2 Animal cruelty is a misdemeanor in Alaska, Arkansas, Idaho, Mississippi, North Dakota, 
South Dakota and Utah. It should be noted that Mississippi has a special statute making it a 
felony to engage in cruelty to livestock. Companion animals and wildlife fall outside the 
purview of the law. Id.  
3 NY Ag. & Mkts. Law § 353-a (1). 
4 PA. ST 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5511 
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partially motivated to enact the statutes because people who harm animals 
are more likely to inflict suffering on human beings, others seem to have 
been moved into action by a deeply felt conviction that inflicting harm on a 
sentient being is morally wrong.  Moreover, some state laws are drafted in a 
manner that suggests that one of the preeminent reasons for adopting such 
legislation was the protection of property.  
Ascertaining the reasons that justify the practice of punishing people 
for engaging in acts of cruelty against animals is not merely of theoretical 
concern. As the recently decided case of People v. García5 demonstrates, it 
is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the proper scope of anti-cruelty 
statutes without first answering the question of why it is that such conduct is 
a crime in the first place.  In García, the Appellate Division of the Supreme 
Court of New York had to determine whether the defendant’s act of 
stomping on a pet goldfish, in the presence of Juan, the nine year old 
custodian of the fish, constituted a felony. In order to do so, the Court 
needed to decide whether instantaneously killing a fish by stepping on him 
constituted an act of “aggravated cruelty”.  
Since the fish died instantly, the defendant contended that he did not 
suffer extreme pain and that his death was caused without special depravity 
or sadism. Thus, he asserted that the killing was not carried out with a 
                                                 
5 812 N.Y.S.2d 66 (2006).   
6 Why is it a Crime to Stomp on a Goldfish?  
heightened level of cruelty.6 The Court rejected the defendant’s contention 
by pointing out that, in view of the legislative history of the statute, whether 
an act demonstrates aggravated cruelty depends on “the state of mind of the 
perpetrator”.7 The Court’s holding also seemed to be heavily influenced by 
the fact that the killing of a household pet in front of a child constitutes a 
“sadistic and depraved act” because it is intended to “inflict emotional pain 
on the boy”.8   
By concluding that a finding of aggravated cruelty depends on 
whether the actor intended to make the owner of the animal suffer, the 
Court was suggesting that the purpose of anti-cruelty statutes is to deter 
people from engaging in acts that cause emotional harm to human beings 
and not protecting animals from unjustifiable inflictions of pain. Thus, 
according to García, the real victims in these cases are not the animals who 
are being mistreated, but the humans who suffer when living creatures are 
harmed. 
This article will show that the Court’s reasoning in García cannot 
withstand careful scrutiny. Concluding that anti-cruelty statutes were 
enacted for reasons other than protecting animals from the unwarranted 
infliction of pain is in tension with basic criminal law principles. 
                                                 
6 Id., at 261. 
7 Id.  
8 These were the words used by the trial court to describe the defendant’s act. People v. 
García,  777 N.Y.S.2d 846. 
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Furthermore, the best way to account for the most salient features of anti-
cruelty statutes is by acknowledging that the victims to be protected by the 
enactment of such laws are animals, not human beings. I will do so in four 
parts.  
Part I of provides a brief recount of the history of Anglo-American 
statutes prohibiting harm to animals. This historical analysis will show that 
many of these statutes were originally enacted as a way to protect private 
property. However, it will also reveal that there has been a marked trend, 
specially in recent times, to punish animal cruelty regardless, and 
sometimes despite, the property interests involved. 
 In Part II, the notions of harm, victimhood and consent will be 
explored in order to lay the groundwork for the claims that will be put forth 
in the remainder of the article. It is difficult to have a meaningful discussion 
about the interest that the law seeks to protect by criminalizing cruelty to 
animals without first understanding the  intricate interrelationship that exists 
between these concepts. In light of the issues that animal cruelty statutes 
raise, particular attention will be paid to discussing John Stuart Mill’s and 
H.L.A. Hart’s conception of the “harm principle”. The legitimacy of 
enacting victimless crimes and the ways in which consent can negate both 
harm and victimhood will also be considered. 
Part III examines five different theories that might be advanced in order 
8 Why is it a Crime to Stomp on a Goldfish?  
to explain the interest that we seek to promote by punishing acts that are 
harmful to animals, namely: (1) protection of property, (2) protection 
against the infliction of emotional harm to those who have ties to the injured 
animal, (3) prevention of future harm to humans, (4) enforcement of a 
moral principle, and (5) protection of the animals themselves.  
In Part IV I will try to explain why it is not necessarily the case, as some 
animal law scholars have argued, that because animal cruelty statutes allow 
for the infliction of harm to animals as a result of hunting, scientific and 
farming activities, the interest primarily sought to be protected by these 
laws is something other than the protection of animals.  Although seductive 
at first glance, this argument is ultimately flawed because it is premised on 
a misunderstanding of the structure of criminal offenses in general and of 
anti-cruelty statutes in particular. Properly understood, the existence of 
privileges that allow people to infringe the prima facie norm against 
harming animals merely reveals that society (rightly or wrongly) believes 
that there are countervailing reasons that justify harming the interest sought 
to be protected by the offense, not that the prohibitory norm was not really 
designed to protect animals in the first place.9 
                                                 
9 In criminal law terms, this can be restated in the following manner: the existence of a 
justification (i.e. self-defense or choice of evils) provides the actor with reasons that allow 
him to infringe the prima facie norm against engaging in such conduct (i.e. the “offense”). 
This does not mean, however, that the existence of a justification (self-defense in a 
homicide case, scientific tests in an animal cruelty case) cancels the reasons that the 
offense provides us for not engaging in the conduct (protecting human life in homicide, 
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I will conclude by arguing that we have decided to criminalize harm to 
animals primarily because we are concerned about the wellbeing of such 
creatures, not because doing so furthers some other human interest. Finally, 
the Court’s analysis in People v. García will be reexamined in light of the 
conclusions advanced in the article.   
  
I. ANIMALS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: HISTORY AND CONTRADICTIONS 
 
The first statute criminalizing abusive conduct towards animals was 
enacted in Great Britain in 1822. The law, commonly known as “Martin’s 
Act”, made it a crime to cruelly beat or otherwise mistreat horses, mules, 
cows, sheep or other cattle.10 At that point in time cruelty to animals did not 
constitute an indictable offense at common law.11 By adopting this statute, 
the English Parliament filled this perceived gap in the law. Thus, prior to 
the enactment of Martin’s Act, conduct constitutive of cruelty to animals 
was only deemed criminal if it satisfied the elements of some other offense 
made punishable at common law, such as breaches of the peace or 
malicious mischief.12 This represented a substantial shift in the state of the 
law. Whereas at common law acts that inflicted unjustifiable pain on 
                                                                                                                            
protecting animals [arguably] in animal cruelty laws). See, generally, Gardner, Fletcher on 
Offences and Defences, 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 817 (2004). 
10 An Act to Prevent the Cruel and Improper Treatment of Cattle (Martin's Act), 1822, 3 
Geo. 4, ch. 71 (Eng.). 
11 State v. Bruner, 12 N.E. 103, 104 (Ind. 1887).  
12 Id. See also Republica v. Teischer, 1 Dall. 335 (Penn. 1788). 
10 Why is it a Crime to Stomp on a Goldfish?  
animals were considered legal wrongs only if the creature harmed was the 
property of another, after the passage of the Martin Act such conduct was a 
crime even when the injured animal was not owned by anyone.  
In the United States, as in England, mistreatment of animals was 
first made a crime through legislation. However, in contrast with the early 
statutes adopted in Great Britain, some of the anti-cruelty laws initially 
enacted in America only made it a criminal offense for someone to engage 
in abusive acts against animals not owned by the person mistreating the 
creature. Take, for example, the 1846 Vermont statute which made it a 
crime to “willfully and maliciously kill, wound, maim or disfigure any 
horse, or horses, or horse kind, cattle, sheep or swine, of another person.”13 
By limiting the scope of the prohibition to acts that cause harm to animals 
belonging to someone else, the Vermont General Assembly was making it 
clear that the purpose of the statute was to protect property rights, not 
animals.  Furthermore, by only punishing cruelty against animals of 
commercial value, the legislature revealed that its preeminent reason for 
prohibiting the conduct was to proscribe acts that were perceived to 
adversely affect important economic interests.14 
Not all anti-cruelty laws adopted in America during the 19th century 
were solely inspired by an interest to protect property rights. Some early 
                                                 
13 1846 Vt. Laws 34.  
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statutes criminalized the malicious mistreatment of animals regardless of 
whether they were the property of someone else. Thus, an 1829 New York 
law made it a crime to “maliciously and cruelly beat or torture any horse, ox 
or other cattle, or any sheep, whether belonging to himself or another”.15 
By making the ownership question irrelevant, this law signified an 
important change in the legal discourse undergirding the anti-cruelty 
movement. Whereas laws like the 1846 Vermont statute clearly regarded 
the owner of the animal as the victim of the offense, statues like the 1829 
New York law seemed to turn this conception of anti-cruelty legislation on 
its head by implying that the legally protected interest was the animal, not 
the own
 
underst
                                                                                                                           
er.  
It should be noted, however, that the 1829 New York law only 
criminalized abusive conduct towards commercially valuable animals. This 
brings to light a tension in anti-cruelty statutes that remains unresolved to 
this day. It is not easy to reconcile the status of animals as victims with the 
idea that only commercially valuable creatures are worthy of protection 
from wanton acts of cruelty. If the purpose of prohibiting the conduct is to 
protect animals from the unjustifiable infliction of pain, it is difficult to
and why economic value should condition the scope of the statutes.  
Unfortunately, albeit for different reasons, most modern anti-cruelty 
 
14 See, generally, David Favre & Vivien Tsang, The Development of Anti-Cruelty Laws 
During the 1800’s, 1 Detroit College of Law Review 1 (1993). 
12 Why is it a Crime to Stomp on a Goldfish?  
statutes are plagued by similar incongruities. While a majority of 
jurisdictions have expanded the scope of anti-cruelty statutes to encompass 
the protection of animals that are not generally considered to be of 
significant economic value, most state anti-cruelty statutes discriminate 
between those individuals who harm a domesticated or companion animal 
and those who injure non-domesticated animals.16 Thus, the killing of a 
rodent with a mousetrap inside private property is generally not considered 
a crime. However, causing the death of a pet hamster is. Another salient 
feature of modern anti-cruelty statutes is the tendency to afford heightened 
legal protection to dogs and cats. In the states of Alabama and Kentucky, 
for example, engaging in acts of cruelty towards a dog or cat is a felony. 
Nonetheless, performing identical acts on horses, cows, rabbits, rodents or 
any oth
                                                                                                                           
er animal is merely a misdemeanor.17 
In view of these considerations, modern anti-cruelty statutes, much 
like their 19th century counterparts, are fraught with contradictions. On the 
one hand, the push to expand the number of animals protected by anti-
cruelty statutes and the increasing tendency to protect animals irrespective 
of questions of ownership suggests that the purpose of adopting these laws 
 
15 N.Y. Rev. stat. tit. 6, 26 (1829). 
16 A couple of states have gone as far as arbitrarily excluding livestock from the 
definition of “animals” protected by their anti-cruelty laws   Iowa Code Ann. § 717(B)(1) 
(West 1993 & Supp. 1998), Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-301(11)(b)(ii) (Supp. 1998) . 
See http://www.animallaw.info/articles/arus5animall69.htm.  
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is to safeguard animals from unnecessary suffering. On the other hand, the 
different treatment that non-companion animals receive as opposed to 
domesticated creatures indicates that the aim of these laws is something 
other than the protection of animals from harm. If the objective of anti-
cruelty statutes is to keep animals free from unnecessary suffering, why 
should it matter whether the animal is domesticated? A rodent killed by a 
mousetrap feels as much pain as a pet hamster killed in a similar manner. 
However, only harm to the latter is deemed criminal under the typical anti-
cruelty
                                                                                                                           
 law.  
New York’s current statute prohibiting abusive conduct towards 
animals, commonly known as “Buster’s Law”, exemplifies many of the 
contradictions that have been described here.18 For starters, even though it 
is considered a crime to perform acts of cruelty against any animal, it is 
only a felony to engage in aggravated cruelty towards a “companion 
animal”.  Moreover, Buster’s Law contains an exemption that allows people 
to engage in harmful acts against animals during the course of several 
activities, such as fishing and hunting. As a result of this provision, the 
killing of a trout during a recreational fishing trip does not constitute a 
punishable crime, whereas the killing of a pet goldfish does. In light of 
these considerations, it is unclear whether the chief purpose of Buster’s Law 
 
17 Al. St. Sect. 12A-11-241.  
18 NY Ag. & Mkts. Law § 353-a (1) 
14 Why is it a Crime to Stomp on a Goldfish?  
is to protect animals from the unjustifiable infliction of pain or to deter 
people from engaging in acts that harm individuals with strong emotional 
ties to a
 correlation 
betwee
                                                
 particular animal or animals.  
Unsurprisingly, in People v. García, the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court of New York struggled to come to grips with the conflicting 
rationales that seem to have underpinned the adoption of Buster’s Law in 
particular and the enactment of anti-cruelty statutes in general. While on 
several occasions the Court seemed to suggest that the victim of the offense 
was the boy who suffered the loss of his beloved pet, on other occasions it 
appeared to suggest that the real victim was the fish who was unjustifiably 
harmed by the defendant. Complicating the matter is the fact that the 
Court’s ruling was also influenced by the contention that cruelty to animals 
should be prohibited because “man's inhumanity to man often begins with 
inhumanity to those creatures that have formed particularly close 
relationships with mankind”.19  Consequently, the Court in García 
elaborated three distinct (and sometimes conflicting) theories of the harm 
that is sought to be prevented by anti-cruelty statutes: (1) harm to those who 
have developed emotional ties to the animal, (2) harm to the animal, and (3) 
the possibility of future harm to humans on the basis of a
n violence against animals and violence against people.  
 
19 People v. Garcia, 777 N.Y.S.2d 846. 
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The purpose of the remainder of this article is to evaluate which of 
these differing conceptions of anti-cruelty statutes better explains and 
justifies our practices of blaming and punishing people for engaging in 
abusive conduct against animals. Before doing so, however, it is necessary 
to briefly examine the notions of victimhood, harm and consent. 
 
II. ND HARM 
 
 
 VICTIMHOOD, CONSENT A
 
A. VICTIMHOOD 
 1. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
Generally speaking, a victim is a party against whom a person has 
committed a crime.20 Therefore, the notions of “victimhood” and harm are 
intertwined. Someone is considered a victim only if he has been harmed by 
another person. Usually, criminal statutes prohibit conduct that causes harm 
to some important interest of the victim. Thus, the typical penal code 
contains sections that prohibit “crimes against the person”, “crimes against 
property”, “crimes against sexual autonomy”, and “crimes against liberty”. 
In each of these instances, an crime is committed when someone 
unjustifiably interferes with the fundamental interests of another person. In 
the crime of theft, for example, the offender unlawfully interferes with 
someone else’s right to private property. When someone commits homicide, 
he is unjustifiably interfering with the victim’s right to life. In the case of 
16 Why is it a Crime to Stomp on a Goldfish?  
rape, the perpetrator seeks pleasure by violating the victim’s fundamental 
right to decide how and when he or she wants to engage in sexual 
interco
 has violated a norm, 
to be su
prostitution, driving 
while i
                                                                                                                           
urse.21 
It should be noted, however, that there are many crimes whose 
consummation does not entail causing harm to a victim. Most drug 
possession offenses represent paradigmatic examples of these types of 
crimes. Take, for example, the offense of possessing marijuana for personal 
consumption.  Note that this conduct in no way interferes with another 
person’s fundamental interests.  The person who commits this offense has 
not denied the value of someone else’s life, nor has he interfered with the 
rights of others.  Thus, there is no victim whose interests are vindicated by 
punishing the offender.22 The perpetrator in these cases
re, but in doing so has not victimized anyone.  
When, as in the case of drug possession offenses, the perpetrator’s 
criminal conduct does not interfere with the interests of another person, he 
is said to have engaged in a “victimless crime”.  Additional examples of 
offenses traditionally regarded as victimless crimes are 
ntoxicated, and engaging in consensual sodomy. 
The government may have various reasons for prohibiting victimless 
 
20 Markus Dubber, Victims in the War on Crime: The Use and Abuse of Victim’s Rights 
158 (NYU Press, 2002). 
21 Luis E. Chiesa, Taking Victims Seriously: A Dworkinian Theory of Punishment, ___ 
Rev. Jur. U.P.R. ___ (forthcoming, 2008). 
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crimes. Sometimes these types of offenses are created as a way of enforcing 
moral principles. This is most often the case when the state prohibits certain 
types of consensual sexual conduct. The criminalization of consensual 
sodomy constitutes a prime example. Even though engaging in such 
conduct harms neither the persons who perform the act nor third parties, it 
has been prohibited because many individuals consider sodomy to be an act 
that con
 
neutral
                                                                                                                           
travenes their religious and moral beliefs.23    
Occasionally the state decides to create a victimless crime as a way 
to deter people from engaging in acts that may harm someone in the future. 
This tends to be the purpose of prohibiting the act of driving under the 
influence of intoxicants. Although driving while intoxicated is not harmful 
per se, those who engage in such conduct are more likely to injure someone 
than those who do not. In these cases the objective of the criminal sanction 
shifts from exacting retribution for a harm done to preventatively
izing dangerous individuals before they engage in harmful conduct.  
Sometimes, as in the case of environmental crimes, it is unclear 
whether the government has created a victimless crime. Consider the 
offense of knowingly releasing hazardous pollutants into the air.24 Engaging 
in this conduct does not directly interfere with the interests of others. Thus, 
at first glance, this offense seems to constitute a victimless crime. However, 
 
22 Id. 
23 See, for example, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
18 Why is it a Crime to Stomp on a Goldfish?  
the aggregate effect of pollution will almost certainly result in harm to our 
health. Hence, in the long run, we are all going to be victims of the 
pernicious consequences of this conduct. Due to the resulting future harm, it 
can be coherently argued that the offense of releasing a hazardous pollutant 
into the air is not a victimless crime despite the fact that such conduct does 
not dire
 to 
enforce
                                                                                                                           
ctly harm anyone at the time the act occurs. 
The legitimacy of creating victimless crimes has been increasingly 
called into question.  As time has passed, societies have become more 
democratic and government less authoritarian, and the focus of the criminal 
law has shifted from the safeguarding of the State to the protection of 
persons.25 Once it is accepted that the chief purpose of penal statutes is to 
vindicate the rights of those that have been harmed by the perpetrator’s 
harmful conduct, it is difficult to justify punishing people for engaging in 
acts that do not interfere with the rights of individuals. Taking this 
contention seriously should lead us to question the legitimacy of creating 
victimless crimes, particularly when the only reason for doing so is
 a particular conception of morality by way of the criminal law.  
 This is not to say, however, that prohibiting conduct that does not 
cause harm to a victim is necessarily illegitimate. No one seriously believes, 
for example, that criminalizing the act of driving while intoxicated is 
 
24 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 
25 Dubber, supra note 20, pp. 152. 
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injudicious or unjustifiable. Although such conduct does not entail 
interference with the interests of others, the undeniable dangerousness of 
the act seems to provide a more than adequate reason for its prohibition.  
Nevertheless, in the absence of compelling reasons that point to the 
contrary, victimless crimes are generally considered to be at least prima 
facie or presumptively illegitimate. However, this presumption of 
illegitimacy can be rebutted by demonstrating that there are sound reasons 
for prohibiting the conduct. 
 
2. VICTIMHOOD AND ANTI-CRUELTY STATUTES 
 
uld be considered a species of the more general crime of criminal 
damage
 
It is unclear whether anti-cruelty statutes prohibit victimless crimes. 
If one considers that the chief purpose of these laws is to protect property 
rights, then it should follow that there is a legally protected victim -- the 
owner of the harmed creature. If conceived in this manner, animal cruelty 
statutes wo
s.  
On the other hand, if one conceives laws criminalizing the 
mistreatment of animals as enactments that purport to deter people from 
inflicting suffering on those who have strong emotional ties to the creatures, 
the victim of the offense would be the person whose sensibilities were 
affected by the act of the perpetrator. This conception of victimhood seemed 
20 Why is it a Crime to Stomp on a Goldfish?  
to partially inform the reasoning of the court in People v. Garcia. By 
implying that the defendant’s act revealed a heightened level of cruelty 
because the killing of the goldfish caused Juan much suffering, the court 
seemed to be suggesting that the victim in these cases is the individual who 
suffers
t “man’s inhumanity to man 
often b
                                                
 when someone harms a creature that he holds dear. 
It can also be argued that cruelty to animals is a crime because those 
who mistreat animals are more likely to harm human beings than those who 
do not. If this were the case, the purpose of punishing those who 
unjustifiably make animals suffer would be to neutralize dangerous 
individuals before they engage in conduct that could harm a human being. 
Under this conception, cruelty to animals would constitute a victimless 
crime, since the conduct is considered criminal in light of the fact that it 
reveals the dangerous nature of the offender and not because the act 
interferes with the rights of persons. In People v. Garcia the Court seemed 
to have had this conception of anti-cruelty statutes in mind when it asserted 
that these laws were enacted in recognition tha
egins with inhumanity to [animals]”.26  
Legislation proscribing the infliction of harm on animals can also be 
defended on the grounds that a majority of the population considers such 
conduct to be immoral. If the perceived immorality of unnecesarily harming 
 
26 People v. Garcia, 777 N.Y.S.2d 846. 
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animals is the sole basis for criminalization of animal cruelty, offenses 
prohibi
violated in 
such a manner that it is appropriate to label them as “victims”.27  
 
 
 
unjustifiable act of forceful subjugation into a permissible act of self-
ting such conduct would clearly constitute victimless crimes.   
Finally, it might be argued that the purpose of laws that make 
cruelty to animals a crime is to protect the creatures from unjustifiable 
inflictions of pain. Under this conception of anti-cruelty statutes the victim 
of the offense is the animal harmed by the wrongful conduct of the 
perpetrator. This approach necessarily requires that we interpret the notion 
of “victimhood” in a broad manner so as to allow for non-humans to qualify 
as victims. Some criminal law theorists object to this expansion of the 
concept noting that only autonomous beings can have their rights 
B. CONSENT 
1. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
The notions of consent and victimless crimes are intertwined. As a 
general rule, someone is considered a victim only when he has been forced 
to do something that he would otherwise not wish to do. If the person 
consents to the act that the alleged offender wanted him to perform, we 
would be hard-pressed to believe that he was victimized by the offender. 
Therefore, a victim’s consent changes what initially appears to be an 
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determination.28 As Professor Dubber aptly points out: 
By consenting, the apparent victim rebuts the presumption of 
victimhood.  He  indicates that another’s act that facially 
satisfies the elements of a crime does no  harm to his autonomy 
in fact.  In light of the consent, an apparent act of  heteronomy is 
revealed as an act of autonomy.29 
 
The transformative effect of consent is apparent in cases involving 
the alleged commission of a rape. In these cases, the consent of the victim 
transforms what would otherwise be considered a deplorable act of sexual 
imposition into an unobjectionable act of lovemaking.30 By consenting to 
the conduct the person is making a conscious decision about what types of 
acts make his life a life worth living.  Therefore, in the absence of coercion 
or of legal capacity to acquiesce to the act, the consenting victim is 
suffering no interference with his rights that need to be vindicated by the 
infliction of punishment.31 Upon closer inspection, it turns out that 
punishing someone for performing an act to which the alleged victim 
consented is tantamount to punishing someone for committing a victimless 
crime.  The reason for this is that if the victim consents to the act, he is not 
really a victim at all.  Consequently, punishing the supposed offender for 
engaging in the consented act is as objectionable as inflicting punishment 
                                                                                                                            
27 Dubber, supra note 20. 
28 Id.  
29 Id. 
30 On the morally transformative nature of consent, see, generally, Alan Wertheimer, 
Consent and Sexual Relations, 2 Legal Theory 89, 90 (1996). 
31 Id. 
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on a person who committed an act that did not cause harm to a victim.32 
Despite the undeniable transformative effects of consent, courts 
have been slow to recognize the acquiescence of the victim as a defense to 
criminal liability. The reticence has been more palpable in cases involving 
the infliction of physical injury or death. Thus, courts have been reluctant to 
allow defendants to plead consent as a defense to the crime of assault. More 
controversially, many jurisdictions have refused to recognize an 
individual’s informed consent to euthanasia as a defense to the crimes of 
murder and assisting in suicide.  
Although courts have been generally unwilling to recognize the 
assent of the victim as a defense to a violent offense, consent is widely 
accepted as a defense to crimes against property. It has consistently been 
held that the taking of property does not constitute theft if the owner of the 
item consented to it.33 Similarly, a defendant cannot be found guilty of 
criminal mischief if the owner of the property consented to its damage or 
destruction. Furthermore, since the owner has the right to do what he wishes 
with his property, he cannot be convicted of committing the offense of 
criminal mischief if he decides to damage his own property.34  
 
                                                 
32 Chiesa, supra note 21. 
33 State v Fahlk, 524 N.W.2d 39 (Neb 1994), People v Smith,  120 Cal. Rptr.2d 831 
(2002)   
34  McKinney's Penal Law § 145.00 
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2. CONSENT AND ANTI-CRUELTY STATUTES 
 
The consent doctrine raises two important issues in the context of 
anti-cruelty statutes. The first matter warranting consideration is whether an 
animal owner’s decision to inflict pain on a creature that rightfully belongs 
to him is (or should be) considered criminal. Also meriting consideration is 
whether someone who harms or kills an animal is (or should be) guilty of a 
crime if the owner of the creature consented to the act. The way in which 
we approach these issues will depend on the conception of anti-cruelty 
statutes that we adopt. On the one hand, the owner’s decision to allow his 
animal to be harmed or killed should not generate criminal liability if one 
considers that the purpose of anti-cruelty statutes is to protect property 
rights. On the other hand, if one believes that the purpose of proscribing 
animal abuse is to protect animals from unjustifiable inflictions of pain, the 
owner’s consent to the harmful conduct should be irrelevant. 
 
C. THE HARM PRINCIPLE 
 
1. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Closely related to the question of whether it is legitimate to punish 
people for committing a victimless crime is the doctrine that has come to be 
called the “harm principle”. First elaborated by the famous philosopher 
John Stuart Mill, this principle has been employed as a means to limit the 
government’s power to criminalize conduct.  According to his formulation 
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of the doctrine, “the only purpose for which power can rightfully be 
exercised over any member of a civilized community against his will is to 
prevent harm to others”.35 As a result of this, Mill concluded that the 
government could not legitimately prohibit an act solely to promote the 
physical or moral wellbeing of the person engaging in the conduct. 
Furthermore, he asserted that the fact that most people consider the 
performance of a particular act to be wrong or unwise is not a sufficient 
reason to warrant criminalizing the conduct.36 
Mill’s thesis was later echoed and further developed by the legal 
theorist H.L.A. Hart. Hart believed that to prohibit conduct merely because 
it is considered immoral is illegitimate because doing so would contradict 
fundamental liberty interests.  He also stated that the distress that people 
feel when others conduct themselves in what they consider to be an 
immoral fashion cannot constitute a punishable harm, since this would be 
“tantamount to punishing them simply because others object to what they 
do; and the only liberty that could coexist with this extension of the 
utilitarian principle (“harm principle”) is liberty to do those things to which 
no one seriously objects. Such liberty plainly is quite nugatory.”37 In other 
words, according to Hart, criminalizing acts because of their immorality is 
illegitimate because it assigns only trifling importance to the fundamental 
                                                 
35 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, 10-11 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed.,1978)  
36 Id.  
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right of individual autonomy.38 
One important consequence of the harm principle is that it casts 
doubt on the propriety of criminalizing an act merely because of its 
dangerousness. Prohibiting such conduct is problematic because “these 
offenses do not proscribe harm itself, but rather the possibility of harm; a 
possibility that need not (and typically does not) materialize when the 
offense is committed.”39  There are myriad examples of non-harmful acts 
that are considered criminal solely because they create risks of harms. 
Perhaps the most prevalent one is the criminalization of the unauthorized 
possession of a weapon. Although the mere possession of a weapon is not 
harmful to anyone, it presumably increases the risk that the possessor might 
use it to injure someone. The justifiability of making use of this type of 
offense as a way of neutralizing dangerous offenders before they engage in 
harmful conduct is unclear.  It is safe to say, however, that the more 
concrete the risk sought to be prevented by the offense is, the more 
justifiable it is to criminalize the conduct. Conversely, as the inherent 
dangerousness of the conduct decreases, the reasons in favor of 
criminalizing the act get progressively weaker. Compare, for example, the 
relative merits of the decision to criminalize the possession of tools 
                                                                                                                            
37 H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality 47 (1963). 
38 Luis E. Chiesa, Normative Gaps in the Criminal Law: A Reasons Theory of Wrongdoing, 
10 New Criminal L. Rev. 1, pp. 131 (2007). 
39 Douglas Husak, Crimes Outside the Core, 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 755, 771 (2004). 
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commonly used for criminal purposes with the prohibition of the possession 
of weapons. Whereas most people seem to believe that criminalizing the 
latter is justifiable, there are considerable doubts with regards to whether 
prohibiting the former is proper. The key to explaining this distinction lies 
in the inherent dangerousness of the items involved. Thus,  it has been 
asserted that an “account of the difference between weapons....and burglar 
tools...is that the former are dangerous or thought to be dangerous to all 
those who might come in contact with them [whereas the latter are not]”.40 
Since weapons pose a more serious risk of causing grave harm to others 
than tools, the decision to criminalize their possession is more defensible 
than the choice to prohibit possessing tools.   
While the harm principle initially afforded courts and commentators 
with an effective tool with which to condemn the enactment of laws that 
were adopted to enforce public morality, the principle has been criticized 
because of the malleability and vagueness of the concept of “harm”.41 Many 
statutes that appear to prohibit conduct solely as a way of enforcing moral 
principles can be easily recast as enactments that aim to prevent the 
causation of indirect harm. Thus, Professor Catharine MacKinnon has 
argued that governmental regulation of pornography, once thought to be at 
odds with the harm principle, can be justified on morally neutral grounds 
                                                 
40 George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 200 (Oxford, 2000). 
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because it is harmful to women since it perpetuates sexism, promotes the 
subjugation of women and fosters inequality.42 In a similar fashion, former 
New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani justified his crackdown on sex 
shops and peep shows in Times Square by focusing on the indirect societal 
harm that they cause, not on their immorality. 
Despite its shortcomings, the harm principle serves to limit the 
government’s power of criminalization by requiring that the state provide 
reasons for prohibiting conduct other than the fact that it is generally 
considered to be immoral.  In some cases, the state can justify prohibiting 
conduct by pointing to its evident dangerousness (drunk driving, for 
example) or by demonstrating that the long term benefits of proscribing 
what would otherwise appear to be an innocuous act justifies criminalizing 
such conduct (banning certain pornographic materials as a way of curbing 
sexism and discrimination, for example).  However, the government will 
occasionally not be able to provide reasons for criminalizing conduct 
besides its perceived immorality. The prohibition of certain sexual acts 
provides a case in point. In the landmark decision of Lawrence v. Texas, for 
example, the United States Supreme Court had to decide whether a law 
making consensual sodomy a crime violated the liberty interests protected 
                                                                                                                            
41 See, generally, Berard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 Journal of 
Criminal L. and Criminology 109 (1999). 
42 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. 
Rev. 1, 7 (1985). 
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by the 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause. In language that closely 
mirrors Mill’s formulation of the harm principle, the Court justified striking 
down the statute by pointing out that “[t]he fact that the governing majority 
in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a 
sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.”43 
 
2. THE HARM PRINCIPLE AND ANTI-CRUELTY STATUTES 
 
The famous English jurist Lord Devlin once argued that anti-cruelty 
statutes were solely enacted as a way of publicly enforcing the widely 
shared view that unjustifiably inflicting pain on an animal is immoral.44 If 
Lord Devlin’s characterization of such laws is correct, criminalizing the 
mistreatment of animals would seem to violate the harm principle. This 
would cast doubt on the legitimacy of enacting such legislation.  
 Lord Devlin’s conception of anti-cruelty statutes is by no means 
universally held. In a famous reply to Devlin, H.L.A. Hart pointed out that: 
It is too often assumed that if a law is not designed to protect one 
man from another its only rationale can be that it is designed to 
punish moral wickedness or, in Lord Devlin’s words, “to enforce a 
moral principle”. Thus it is often urged that statutes punishing 
cruelty to animals can only be explained in that way. But it is 
certainly intelligible, both as an account of the original motives 
inspiring such legislation and as the specification of an aim widely 
held to be worth pursuing, to say that the law is here concerned with 
the suffering, albeit only of animals, rather than with the immorality 
of torturing them. Certainly no one who supports this use of the 
criminal law is thereby bound in consistency to admit that the law 
                                                 
43 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003). 
44 Lord Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals 17 (1965). 
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may punish forms of immorality which involve no suffering to any 
sentient being. 
 
Thus, anti-cruelty legislation does not violate the harm principle as long 
as we interpret the principle as one that allows for the justifiable imposition 
of punishment whenever the actor’s conduct causes harm to another 
sentient being (i.e. humans and animals). 
 
III. THE INTERESTS SOUGHT TO BE PROTECTED BY ANTI-CRUELTY 
STATUTES: FIVE PLAUSIBLE THEORIES 
 
A. PROTECTION OF PROPERTY 
 
1. THE CASE IN FAVOR OF CONCEIVING ANTI-CRUELTY STATUTES AS A WAY 
OF PROTECTING PROPERTY INTERESTS 
 
Professor Gary Francione recently stated that, “as far as the law is 
concerned, animals are nothing more than commodities”.45 This has led 
him, and many others,46 to conclude that, for all relevant legal purposes, 
animals are treated as property. As a result of this, it would be tempting to 
conclude that the purpose of anti-cruelty statutes is to protect the property 
interests that humans have in animals.  
The contention that the purpose of prohibiting abusive conduct 
against animals is to protect property rights finds some historical support. 
As was discussed in Part I of this article, cruelty to animals was not a crime 
                                                 
45 Garcy Francione, Reflections on Animals, Property and the Law and Rain Without 
Thunder, 70 Law and Contemporary Problems 9 (2007).  
46 See, for example, David N. Cassuto, Bred Meat: The Cultural Foundation of the 
Factory Farm, 70 Law and Contemporary Problems 59, 77 (2007). 
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at common law. At the time, killing or harming an animal would be 
considered an offense only if doing so satisfied some other crime 
punishable at common law. If any such offense were to be infringed, it 
would typically be a crime against property such as trespass or criminal 
mischief. Similarly, the first anti-cruelty statute only made it punishable for 
someone to mistreat animals belonging to another person. Therefore, the 
owner of the creature was originally free to inflict as much pain on the 
animal as he saw fit.  
Recent enactments have generally broadened the scope of anti-
cruelty offenses to nominally encompass the protection of most animals, 
including those that are not owned by anyone. This might suggest that, 
contrary to their 19th century counterparts, modern anti-cruelty statutes 
protect interests other than property. It should be noted, however, that some 
aspects of these laws do seem to perpetuate the notion that anti-cruelty 
statutes are enacted primarily as a way of protecting private property. 
Consider, for example, how the protection afforded to certain animals, such 
as fish or birds, depends on whether they belong to someone or not. Most 
statutes generally authorize people to harm fish or birds if they do so while 
fishing or hunting. Since no one has a claim of right over these animals 
while they are living in the wild, at least until they catch, trap or kill them, 
harming them does not affect any property interest. However, the legal 
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protection afforded to these creatures substantially increases once the 
animal belongs to someone. Thus, the acquisition of property rights over 
these kinds of animals has a significant transformative effect. Before they 
become private property, many people are free to harm them. However, 
once someone has a claim of right over the creature, no one, with the 
possible exception of the owner, can lawfully mistreat the animal.  
It is worth mentioning that if what is sought to be protected by anti-
cruelty statutes is a property interest, the victim of such crimes would be the 
owner of the animal, not the creature itself. If conceived in this manner, 
these statutes should not be regarded as enacting a victimless crime. 
Furthermore, if the reason for criminalizing the mistreatment of animals is 
to avoid harm to property, the enactment of anti-cruelty statutes also 
satisfies the harm principle. 
2. THE CASE AGAINST CONCEIVING ANTI-CRUELTY STATUTES AS A WAY OF 
PROTECTING PROPERTY INTERESTS 
 
 Even though a property-based conception of anti-cruelty statutes 
adequately explains certain features of these laws, it fails to account for 
some of their most distinctive characteristics. Consider the significant 
protection given to dogs and cats in most jurisdictions (mistreating a dog or 
cat is considered a felony in many states, whereas mistreating some other 
animal is not). The increased degree of protection provided to these animals 
does not depend on whether they are owned by someone. Thus, torturing a 
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stray dog is considered a felony in most states regardless of whether 
someone has a claim of right over the animal.  
 Property based conceptions of anti-cruelty laws are also difficult to 
reconcile with statutes that make it a crime to encourage dog-fighting or 
cock-fighting. Such conduct is considered an offense in all fifty states.47 
Interestingly, the act remains criminal even if the owners of the animals 
voluntarily decide to engage in the activity. Since these laws protect 
animals in circumstances in which doing so will be detrimental to the 
pecuniary interests of their owners, the protection conferred in this context 
is incompatible with the position that anti-cruelty statutes are primarily 
enacted as a way to advance property interests. 
 It should also be noted that every jurisdiction makes it criminal for 
the owner of a pet to mistreat his animal. The adoption of this type of 
legislation is at odds with a property-based conception of anti-cruelty 
statutes because the unqualified protection afforded to pets against harmful 
acts of their owners is contrary to the general principle of property law that 
an owner has a right to do what he wishes to his property, including 
destroying or damaging it.  
 
                                                 
47 7 U.S.C.A § 2156 (2007), NY Ag. & Mkts. Law § 351 
The only U.S. jurisdiction in which cock-fighting is not considered a crime is Puerto 
Rico. The reason for this seems to lie in the cultural and historical significance that cock-
fighting has for many people in the island, particularly those who are over 60 and live in 
rural areas.   
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B. PROTECTION AGAINST EMOTIONAL HARM 
 
1. THE CASE IN FAVOR OF CONCEIVING ANTI-CRUELTY STATUTES AS A 
MEANS OF PROTECTING HUMANS AGAINST THE INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL 
HARM 
 
It might be cogently argued that the chief purpose of anti-cruelty 
statutes is to prevent people from causing harm to persons with strong 
emotional ties to the mistreated animal. I will call this theory the “emotional 
harm” conception of animal-cruelty statutes.  This conception dovetails in 
several important respects with the property-based approach to animal 
cruelty laws. Since the owners of animals often develop strong emotional 
ties to their animals, they will typically be the ones who suffer the most 
when someone unjustifiably harms their pets. Ownership, however, is not 
necessarily determinative of whether someone has developed a close 
emotional relationship with the animal. One can easily imagine instances in 
which the owner of the creature has no affective attachment to his pet. By 
the same token, one can conceive of many instances in which someone 
other than the owner has cultivated a close sentimental link with the animal. 
As a result of this, ownership is typically, though not necessarily, indicative 
of a significant emotional bond with the animal. However, under this 
conception of anti-cruelty statutes, the ultimate purpose of these laws is to 
protect people from suffering emotional harm, not to safeguard their 
property interests. 
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 The “emotional harm” approach to animal cruelty laws is 
particularly apt for explaining the heightened level of legal protection that is 
traditionally afforded to companion animals. According to the American 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA), companion 
animals are “domesticated or domestic-bred animals whose physical, 
emotional, behavioral and social needs can be readily met as companions in 
the home, or in close daily relationship with humans.”48 This definition is 
similar to the ones adopted in the majority of jurisdictions in the United 
States.49 Thus, by definition, companion animals are those creatures that are 
more likely to have close and significant ties with human beings. 
Consequently, if one believes that the principal aim of anti-cruelty statutes 
is to prevent people from engaging in conduct that can sever the strong link 
that unites animals and humans, it makes sense to protect companion 
animals more than other creatures.  
 So conceived, animal-cruelty statutes would seem to satisfy the 
harm principle, for the principal reason of criminalizing the conduct would 
be to avoid emotional harm to others. Furthermore, these statutes would not 
create victimless crimes, since there is a victim whose interests are 
vindicated by punishing those who infringe the norm against harming 
                                                 
48 ASPCA Official Policies and Positions Sec. 2.2, at 
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animals -- the human with close ties to the creature.  
This appeared to be the conception of animal cruelty laws that the lower 
court had in mind in People v. García when it seemed to suggest that the 
defendant’s actions evinced an increased degree of cruelty because they 
were calculated to inflict suffering on the person with the closest emotional 
ties to the pet goldfish- Juan. By focusing on the impact that the 
perpetrator’s conduct had on the boy instead of the harm that the act caused 
to the animal, the Court was clearly implying that the principal aim of the 
statute is to prevent human suffering, not to protect animals from 
unjustifiable inflictions of pain. 
 
2. THE CASE AGAINST CONCEIVING ANTI-CRUELTY STATUTES AS A MEANS 
OF PROTECTING HUMANS AGAINST THE INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL HARM 
 
 The proposition that the purpose of anti-cruelty statutes is to protect 
humans from emotional harm cannot be easily reconciled with the broad 
scope of typical animal cruelty laws. Take, for example, South Dakota’s 
animal cruelty statute. This law makes it a crime to harm any “mammal, 
bird, reptile, amphibian, or fish” by engaging in any “act or omission 
whereby unnecessary, unjustifiable, or unreasonable physical pain or 
suffering is caused, permitted, or allowed to continue including acts of 
mutilation”.50 The statute protects many animals (most reptiles and 
                                                 
50 S D C L § 9-29-11; S D C L § 40-1-1 
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amphibians) that typically do not have close daily relationships with 
humans. Giving legal protection to such animals is difficult to explain under 
an “emotional harm” approach to animal cruelty statutes. Furthermore, 
harming stray dogs or cats is considered a crime even if no one has 
developed a strong emotional bond with the animals. This is the case even if 
the creature harmed is despised by most or all of the members of the 
community. As far as the law is concerned, animals are deemed worthy of 
legal protection whether they are liked or not.  
Finally, the emotional harm approach to animal cruelty statutes cannot 
satisfactorily account for the widespread prohibition of dog and cock 
fighting. Most of the people who participate in this type of activity treat the 
animals involved as either a source of income or as entertainment. 
Moreover, they are evidently aware of the fact that many of the animals will 
suffer great pain and/or death as a result of the fights. Since the people 
involved in these sports treat the animals involved as disposable objects that 
exist solely to generate money or pleasure, it cannot be said that the 
principal reason for criminalizing dog or cock fighting is to prevent 
psychological harm to those who have developed close ties to the animals. 
In these cases conduct is made criminal despite the fact that the people 
generally associated with these events do not suffer when the animals are in 
pain. Typically, the opposite seems to be true: they enjoy watching the 
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creatures suffer. 
C. PREVENTION OF FUTURE HARM TO HUMANS 
 
1. THE CASE IN FAVOR OF CONCEIVING ANTI-CRUELTY STATUTES AS A 
MEANS OF PREVENTING FUTURE HARM TO HUMANS 
 
Perhaps the mainstream belief with regard to animal cruelty statutes is 
that they are enacted as a way of identifying and neutralizing presumptively 
dangerous individuals before they engage in acts that are harmful to human 
beings. I will dub this view the “future harm” conception of anti-cruelty 
statutes. The philosophical roots of this view can be traced back to 
Immanuel Kant, who once famously stated that “he who is cruel to animals 
becomes hard also in his dealings with men. We can judge the heart of a 
man by his treatment of animals”.51  
 Defenders of this approach to anti-cruelty statutes believe that 
criminalizing the mistreatment of animals is warranted because “[t]here is 
ample evidence to suggest that individuals who engage in acts of animal 
cruelty have a greater probability of committing acts of violence against 
people as compared to individuals who have no history of committing acts 
of violence against animals.”52 This conception is so prevalent that many 
organizations devoted to the protection of animals have defended it in an 
effort to justify the enactment of broader anti-cruelty legislation. The “First 
                                                 
51 Immanuel Kant, Duties in Regard to Animals, in Animal Rights and Human Obligations 
23, 24 (Tom Regan & Peter Singer eds., 2d ed. 1989). 
52 Charlotte A. Lacroix, Another Weapon for Combating Family Violence: Prevention 
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Strike” campaign of the Humane Society constitutes one such example. The 
purpose of this program is to reduce animal abuse by “rais[ing] public and 
professional awareness about the connection between animal cruelty and 
other violent crime violence and to help communities identify some of the 
origins of violence, predict its patterns, and prevent its escalation”.53 
There is significant evidence tending to demonstrate that a 
correlation between animal cruelty and interpersonal violence exists. 
Anecdotal confirmation of this link abounds. Some of the most famous 
serial killers, including the Hillside strangler, Son of Sam, the Boston 
Strangler and Ted Bundy had a history of abusing animals.54 Empirical 
evidence also seems to substantiate the correlation. According to some 
studies, animal abusers are at least four times more likely to commit violent 
crimes or offenses against property than those who do not mistreat 
animals.55 
 Adoption of the “future harm” conception of animal-cruelty statutes 
should lead to punishing only those acts that have been shown to be 
correlated to interpersonal violence. This might explicate why it is typically 
not considered criminal to harm animals during the course of certain 
                                                                                                                            
of Animal Abuse, 4 Animal Law 1, 8 (1998). 
53 First Strike: The Connection Between Animal Cruelty and Human Violence, at 
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54 Lacroix, supra note 52, pp. 8. 
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activities, such as fishing, hunting and farming. Since there is no significant 
link between engaging in such activities and violence against people, those 
who believe that animal-cruelty statutes should be adopted as a way of 
preventing future harm to humans do not have legitimate reasons for 
punishing such conduct. 
The Garcia court expressly recognized that one of the considerations 
that motivated the adoption of New York’s anti-cruelty statute was the 
connection between animal abuse and violent crimes. This was such a 
preeminent concern of lawmakers that then Governor Pataki defended the 
proposed amendments to the anti-cruelty statutes by pointing out that 
“gruesome acts [of torture endured by animals], coupled with recent studies 
that reveal a correlation between violence against animals and future acts of 
violence against humans, underscore the need to enhance penalties for 
animal cruelty”.56 
2. THE CASE AGAINST CONCEIVING ANTI-CRUELTY STATUTES AS A MEANS 
OF PREVENTING FUTURE HARM TO HUMANS 
 
According to the future harm conception of anti-cruelty statutes, the 
purpose of enacting laws criminalizing animal abuse is to identify 
dangerous individuals before they decide to harm a human being. If this 
were the case, the justifiability of adopting such laws would be questionable 
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because doing so would violate the harm principle. Since the possible harm 
sought to be prevented by criminalizing animal cruelty – future injury to 
human beings – does not always transpire, it cannot be held that such 
conduct is prohibited because it causes direct harm to others, as the harm 
principle would require. 
 Furthermore, a legislature would be creating a victimless crime if it 
proscribed animal mistreatment solely because of its correlation with 
interpersonal violence. By ascertaining that the purpose of animal cruelty 
statutes is to avoid injury to a victim in the future, the legislature is 
implying that the perpetrator’s present conduct doesn’t yet interfere with 
personal interests. As was previously discussed, the legitimacy of 
prohibiting conduct that does not violate the rights of a victim is unclear.   
The future harm conception of anti-cruelty statutes inevitably leads 
to shifting the focus of these laws from avoiding harm to animals to 
neutralizing presumptively dangerous individuals. Therefore, as one 
commentator has suggested, the decision to criminalize abusive treatment of 
animals as a way to prevent possible future harm to humans is grounded on 
the “recognition that the solution to a violent society does not lie in the 
characterization of the victim but in the characteristics of the offender.”57 
This might explain why the Garcia court suggested that the key to 
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42 Why is it a Crime to Stomp on a Goldfish?  
determining whether the defendant should be convicted of a felony because 
his act evinced a heightened degree of cruelty required an examination of 
his state of mind instead of an assessment of the amount of pain inflicted on 
the pet goldfish. If the principal purpose of anti-cruelty laws is to prevent 
future harm to humans, the gradation of punishment for animal abuse 
should be dependent on the perceived dangerousness of the offender and not 
on the actual anguish endured by the creature.  This is somewhat 
counterintuitive. Why should a finding of aggravated cruelty depend on 
anything other than an evaluation of the degree and extent of the suffering 
of the victim?  
It is also worth mentioning that the future harm conception of laws 
proscribing animal abuse cannot satisfactorily account for two distinctive 
features of modern anti-cruelty legislation, namely: the criminalization of 
negligent mistreatment of pets and the prohibition of cock fighting. 
Empirical studies demonstrate that there is a correlation between intentional 
acts of cruelty against animals and interpersonal violence. Thus, researchers 
have been quick to point out that many murderers have a history of 
intentionally harming animals by, for example, setting them on fire.58 
However, no proven link exists between negligent mistreatment of pets and 
                                                 
58 6 ANIMAL L. 1, 21 Enacting and enforcing felony animal cruelty laws to prevent 
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future acts of violence against humans.59 The person who carelessly forgets 
to arrange to have her pet fed during a vacation is guilty of animal abuse 
despite the fact that performing such conduct does not substantially increase 
the likelihood that the pet owner will harm a human being in the future.  
Similarly, encouraging cock fighting is a crime although the people 
involved in it are typically not more likely to engage in violent interpersonal 
crime than those who do not partake in such activities. The absence of a 
correlation between participation in cock fighting and violence against 
humans is particularly evident in the case of the many Latinos who view the 
practice of breeding and training fighting cocks as a family and cultural 
tradition.60 It would be absurd to argue that the Latinos who engage in cock 
fighting are more prone to inflicting harm on humans than the average 
person. Thus, the future harm conception of anti-cruelty statutes is a 
particularly weak basis upon which to ground the criminalization of cock 
fighting. It seems obvious that such spectacles are banned in order to avoid 
unjustifiable harm to animals, not as a means of preventing future possible 
harm to humans. 
 
                                                 
59 Stephen R. Kellert & Alan R. Felthous, Childhood Cruelty Toward Animals Among 
Criminals and Non-Criminals, in Cruelty to Animals and Interpersonal Violence 194, 208 
(Randall Lockwood & Frank R. Ascione eds., 1998). This study discusses intentional acts 
of violence against humans and the link with violent behavior towards animals, but does 
not suggest negligent treatment of animals has a link with future harm to humans.  
60See, Cockfighting Still Popular in Puerto Rico (article discussing cock fighting as a 
tradition and considered a gentleman’s sport in country of Puerto Rico), in  
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=2822082  
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D. ENFORCEMENT OF MORAL VIEWS HELD BY A MAJORITY OF THE 
POPULATION 
 
1. THE CASE IN FAVOR OF CONCEIVING ANTI-CRUELTY STATUTES AS A 
MEANS OF ENFORCING A MORAL PRINCIPLE 
 
 Various courts and commentators (most notably, Lord Devlin) have 
posited that the chief purpose of anti-cruelty legislation is to promote a 
moral view held by a majority of the population.61 I will call this approach 
the “public enforcement of morality” conception of animal cruelty statutes. 
Proponents of this conception argue that the perceived immorality of the 
conduct justifies its criminalization. 
 This conception is appealing because most people do believe that 
unjustifiably inflicting harm on an animal is immoral. Thus, the elegance of 
this view lies in its simplicity. Why should we not criminalize that which 
most, if not all, deem to be a morally objectionable course of action? 
 Another advantage of the public enforcement of morality conception 
of anti-cruelty laws is that it can satisfactorily explain why it is generally 
not considered criminal to harm animals during the course of certain 
activities such as fishing and hunting. Since most people consider that 
fishing and hunting constitute instances of morally acceptable behavior, no 
moral principle would be promoted by proscribing such conduct.  
 This view of animal cruelty legislation also succeeds where most 
                                                 
61 Gary Francione, Animals, property, and legal welfarism: “Unnecessary” suffering 
and the “humane” treatmet of animals 46 Rutgers. L. Rev 721 (1994)  
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other approaches fail. The criminalization of dog and cock fighting is easily 
explicable under this conception. These activities were not considered 
criminal in the past because at that time there was no clear consensus with 
regards to whether or not engaging in such behavior was deemed immoral. 
However, as time has passed and societal values have changed, different 
groups of people have coalesced in decrying the immorality of animal 
abuse. The crystallization of this moral consensus paved the way for the 
proscription of the conduct in modern times. 
 
2. THE CASE AGAINST CONCEIVING ANTI-CRUELTY STATUTES AS A MEANS 
OF ENFORCING A MORAL PRINCIPLE 
 
 The principal objection that can be leveled against the public 
enforcement of morality view of animal cruelty statutes is that most courts 
and commentators believe that the fact that a majority of the population 
believes that a certain act is immoral is not in itself a sufficient reason for 
criminalizing the conduct. The principle laid down by the Supreme Court in 
Lawrence v. Texas is worth repeating: “[t]he fact that the governing 
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral 
is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.” 
 Furthermore, this conception of anti-cruelty legislation is wholly 
incompatible with the harm principle. Taking this principle seriously 
requires that we only proscribe conduct that interferes with the rights of 
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others. However, no one has a right to have his own moral views publicly 
enforced by way of the criminal law. This is the case even when a person’s 
moral principles coincide with those held by a substantial portion of the 
population. People should not have to endure punishment and the 
deprivation of liberty and/or property that it entails just because many 
object to his conduct on purely moral grounds. In a tolerant and pluralistic 
society, something in addition to the perceived immorality of the actor’s 
conduct must be shown before we deem that person to be a “criminal”. 
 
E. PREVENTION OF HARM TO ANIMALS 
 
1. THE CASE IN FAVOR OF CONCEIVING ANTI-CRUELTY STATUTES AS A 
MEANS OF PREVENTING HARM TO ANIMALS 
 
Perhaps the interest sought to be protected by anti-cruelty statutes is the 
prevention of harm to animals. After all, these laws are typically referred to 
as “animal” cruelty statutes. The view that these laws aim to protect 
animals from the unjustifiable infliction of pain has much to commend it. 
For starters, it seems to explain the most salient features of modern anti-
cruelty legislation. The decisions to criminalize the negligent mistreatment 
of pets and to proscribe dog and cock fighting can easily be accounted for 
under this conception. Since negligently mistreating animals causes them to 
suffer unnecessarily, it is perfectly sensible to proscribe such conduct in 
order to protect the creatures. Similarly, given that dogs and cocks used in 
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fights endure incredible amounts of pain, there are legitimate reasons to 
prohibit the fights as a means of furthering the protection of the animals 
involved.  
 Moreover, contrary to the public enforcement of morality view, the 
conception of anti-cruelty statutes discussed in this section is compatible 
with the harm principle. As H.L.A. Hart has rightly pointed out, 
criminalizing animal abuse does not violate this principle as long as we 
construe it in such a way that allows for the criminalization of conduct that 
harms a sentient being.  The proscription of conduct that interferes with the 
fundamental interests of others is universally held to be legitimate. Thus, 
provided that we consider animals to have interests worthy of legal 
protection, there should be no objection to prohibiting animal abuse. 
Fortunately, most people now believe that animals do have an interest in 
being held free from unnecessary suffering. This basic interest stems from 
their sentience, that is, from their capacity to experience pain. Since our 
experience has led us to conclude that feeling pain is an unpleasant 
occurrence, we have good reason to abstain ourselves from causing pain to 
other beings, whether they are human or not.          
 As long as anti-cruelty statutes are conceived as laws that protect 
animals from enduring direct suffering, they would not constitute victimless 
crimes. So conceived, the legally protected victim would be the creature 
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harmed by the perpetrator’s conduct. Some would object to this 
conceptualization of victimhood by pointing out that only human beings 
should qualify as victims.62 This argument would only hold, however, if 
there were some distinctive human characteristic beyond the capacity to feel 
pain that might justify affording humans more legal protection than animals. 
Professor Dubber believes that the human capacity for exercising 
meaningful autonomy over their lives warrants such a differentiated 
treatment.63 The problem with this contention is that humans are considered 
victims even if they lack the capacity to meaningfully exercise their 
autonomy. A newly born child, for example, has no more capacity for 
autonomy than a dog or a monkey. Nevertheless, if someone were to harm 
such a child, no one would seriously contend that he should not be 
considered a victim of a crime. Thus, it seems that, in cases such as these, 
the defining characteristic of victimhood is sentience, not autonomy.  
 Nonetheless, this does not mean that there are never sound reasons 
for legally discriminating between humans and animals. It could be 
coherently argued, for example, that, in light of their unique capacity for 
autonomy, humans should never be considered the property of anyone else. 
However, since animals presumably don’t understand or care about notions 
of ownership, their interests in not being considered property are arguably 
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personhood to be a necessary condition for victimhood. Dubber, supra note 20. 
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weaker than interests humans have with regards to the same issue. 
Some scholars, like Gary Francione, argue that there is such a thing as 
“animal autonomy” that should be considered worthy of legal protection.64 
If this were the case, the reasons for discriminating between animals and 
humans, at least with regards to questions about the legitimacy of owning 
such beings, disappear. However, one need not agree with this proposition 
in order to defend the notion that animals should qualify as victims. For this 
limited purpose, their capacity to feel pain appears to suffice. 
2. THE CASE AGAINST CONCEIVING ANTI-CRUELTY STATUTES AS A MEANS 
OF PREVENTING HARM TO ANIMALS 
 
The conception that anti-cruelty statutes are enacted as a way of 
protecting animals against the unjustifiable infliction of pain appears to 
conflict with certain features of these laws.  Particularly difficult to explain 
under this view is the fact that it is not a punishable crime to harm an 
animal during the course of fishing or hunting activities. If it is really the 
case that these statutes aim to prevent harm to animals, what superior 
interest might justify harming them during the course of fishing or hunting 
activities? 
  While it may be argued that the economic and entertainment 
interests that are furthered by these activities justify harming the animals, 
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many will find these reasons for engaging in the conduct unsatisfying. 
However, it would be mistaken to conclude that, in light of these 
considerations, the purpose of animal cruelty statutes is not to protect 
animals. It might be argued that although these laws do in fact protect 
animals, they assign too much weight to countervailing interests that might 
justify an infraction of the prohibition. Thus, the problem doesn’t lie with 
the purpose of the statute, which is by and large a salutary one, but with the 
scope of the reasons that might justify what would otherwise constitute a 
nominal infraction of the law. In order to fully understand this argument, a 
discussion of the structure of criminal offenses generally and of anti cruelty 
statutes in particular is warranted.  
IV. ACTIVITIES HARMFUL TO ANIMALS EXEMPTED FROM PUNISHMENT AND 
THE STRUCTURE OF CRIMINAL OFFENSES AND ANTI-CRUELTY STATUTES 
 
A. THE CLAIM 
 
 Animal law scholars frequently claim that the fact that anti cruelty 
statutes are riddled with exceptions that allow people to harm animals 
demonstrates that these statutes are enacted to ensure that humans continue 
to exploit such creatures rather than to protect them.65 Acceptance of this 
proposition typically leads to odd intepretations of animal cruelty laws.  
Take, for example, the views espoused by Professor Taimie Bryant in a 
recent article. In discussing the way in which the criminal law deals with 
 Why is it a Crime to Stomp on a Goldfish? 51 
cases involving harm caused to egg-laying chickens, she stated that: 
[T]he law does not identify as “cruel” the practices that directly 
cause their suffering. If the suffering of these hens is deemed 
“necessary” for the eggs they supply to humans, then that suffering 
simply doesn't count in legal terms, nor does the suffering of the 
humans who care about that suffering.”66  
 
This reading misapprehends the conceptual structure of criminal 
offenses by confusing the inculpatory (whether the suffering of the hens 
“counts” as legally relevant harm) and exculpatory (whether there are 
reasons that justify the infliction of legally relevant suffering) dimensions of 
animal cruelty statutes. This, in turn, leads to a failure to grasp the 
communicative meaning of the exceptions that plague the laws prohibiting 
animal abuse.  
In the remainder of this section I will explore the structure of punishable 
crimes in an attempt to both substantiate my contention that the 
aforementioned reading of animal cruelty offenses is miguided and to 
demonstrate why it is not true that the exceptions that plague these laws 
reveal that they are primarily enacted to further human wellbeing rather 
than to protect animals from unjustifiable harm.   
                                                                                                                            
65 See, for example, GARY L. FRANCIONE, RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER: THE IDEOLOGY 
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66 Taimie L. Bryant, Trauma, Law and Advocacy for Animals, 1 Journal of Animal 
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B. A PRIMER ON THE CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE OF CRIMINAL OFFENSES 
 
1. THE INCULPATORY VS. EXCULPATORY DIMENSION OF PUNISHABLE CRIMES 
AND THE OFFENSE/JUSTIFICATION DISTINCTION 
 
Punishable crimes have both an inculpatory and an exculpatory 
dimension.67 A person that engages in conduct that satisfies the elements of 
an offense inculpates himself.68 Thus, David incriminates himself if he kills 
a human being (i.e. satisfies the elements of the offense of homicide). 
Furthermore, a person who has performed an act that satisfies the elements 
of an offense has engaged in conduct that is prima facie wrongful. 
Consequently, David’s act of  killing a human being is, all things being 
equal (i.e. prima facie), unlawful.69  
This, of course, does not mean that conduct that satisfies the elements of 
an offense is necessarily wrongful. An actor may escape liability despite 
having inculpated himself by infringing the elements of an offense if he can 
succesfully plead a justification defense.70 Therefore, if David can 
demonstrate that he acted in justifiable self-defense, he will not be punished 
even though he engaged in conduct that was prima facie wrongful. The 
presence of justificatory conditions such as self-defense or necessity 
                                                 
67 See, for example, FLETCHER, supra note 40, at 562.   
68 Id.  
69 See my Normative Gaps, supra note 38, at 117-118.  
70 An actor can also avoid liability by pleading an excuse defense such as insanity. 
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transforms the actor’s prima facie wrongful act into conduct that is, all 
things being considered, not wrongful.71 
It should be noted that conduct may be considered lawful either because 
it does not inculpate the actor (i.e. does not satisfy the elements of an 
offense) or because it should be exculpated in light of the presence of 
circumstances which provide the actor with reasons for engaging in the 
prima facie wrongful act (i.e. the actor has a “justification defense”). It 
would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the actor’s acquittal in both 
of these instances means the same thing. As I will demonstrate in the next 
sub-section, there is a crucial difference between conduct that is not 
wrongful because it does not satisfy the elements of an offense and conduct 
that is lawful because it is justified. This distinction proves to be crucial to a 
proper analysis of the structure and meaning of anti-cruelty offenses.    
 
2. THE COMMUNICATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE OFFENSE/JUSTIFICATION 
DISTINCTION 
 
a. HARMFUL VS. NON-HARMFUL LEGAL CONDUCT 
 
The communicative significance of the offense/justification 
distinction can be illustrated by examining the difference between the acts 
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of shooting at a piece of paper and shooting at a person in self-defense.72 
The act of shooting at a piece of paper is lawful because it does not satisfy 
the elements of an offense made criminal by our laws. Since this conduct is 
not prohibited, engaging in it does not cause harm to an interest protected 
by law. Thus, the act of shooting at a piece of paper, like any other conduct 
that does not satisfy the elements of an offense, is irrelevant for the criminal 
law.  
 Shooting at a human being in self-defense is also lawful. However, 
in contrast with the act of shooting at a piece of paper, this type of conduct 
does satisfy the elements of an offense: assault.73 Given that this conduct is 
prohibited, performing it interferes with an interest that is otherwise 
protected by the law – physical integrity. Obviously, the injury caused to 
the person who was shot “counts” as harm as far as the law is concerned. 
Therefore, the act of shooting at a person, is relevant for the criminal law 
even though it is not wrongful because of the presence of justificatory 
circumstances (i.e. self-defense).  
As one can see, these acts are lawful due to very distinct reasons. 
The act of shooting at a piece of paper does not satisfy the elements of an 
                                                 
72 This is a variation of an example proposed by one of the greatest German criminal 
law scholars of the 20th Century- Hans Welzel - as a way to illustrate the 
offense/justification distinction in HANS WELZEL, DERECHO PENAL ALEMÁN 97-98 (Juan 
Bustos Ramírez & Sergio Yáñez Pérez trans., 4th ed., 1997).   
73 This, of course, assumes that the person did not die as a result of the conduct. If he 
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offense. This type of conduct does not cause harm to an interest that the law 
seeks to protect. Hence, the law does not provide us with reasons to abstain 
from engaging in the act. Contrarily, the act of shooting at a person in self-
defense satisfies the elements of the offense of assault and injures one of the 
most important interests protected by the criminal law. Since this type of 
conduct is harmful, the law provides us with sound reasons to not engage in 
the act (protecting life or physical integrity), even if doing so would be 
justified. 
b. REASONS AND THE OFFENSE/JUSTIFICATION DISTINCTION 
 
Another way of making sense of the offense/justification distinction 
is by examining the different manner in which these categories seek to mold 
human conduct. By criminalizing offenses, we aim to provide people with 
reasons against engaging in the prohibited course of action.74 Take, for 
example, the offense of arson. When we prohibit the act of setting property 
of another on fire without his consent, we are providing the citizenry with a 
sound reason against engaging in this type of conduct. Thus, if Randy were 
to ask Ralph whether he should burn down Sasha’s corn field, Ralph could 
coherently point to the fact that doing so would satisfy the elements of a 
criminal offense as a sound reason for Randy not to engage in the conduct. 
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“not to peform the prohibitory act” and, by way of example, that the “norm that prohibits 
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Contrarily, the law provides no reasons against engaging in conduct that 
is not constitutive of an offense. Thus, the law provides no reasons that can 
be advanced against Sasha’s decision to burn down his own corn field in 
order to build a barn, for this conduct does not satisfy the elements of an 
offense.75 Although people might have myriad grounds for opposing 
Sasha’s decision to burn down his corn field, they cannot claim that such 
grounds make Sasha’s decision to perform the conduct illegal.    
Justifications, on the other hand, do not provide us with reasons to 
abstain from performing a given act.  When we recognize the existence of a 
justification, we aim to provide people with sound reasons in favor of 
engaging in conduct that does satisfy the elements of an offense. Hence, 
justifications provide us with “legally admissible reason[s] in favour of 
[acting in] nonconformity with the norm”.76  
Suppose, for example, that Randy now asked Ralph whether he could 
burn down Sasha’s corn field in order to create a firebreak that will prevent 
three homes from being engulfed by flames. This time, Ralph could respond 
by stating that the existence of justificatory circumstances (necessity/choice 
of evils) provide Randy with sound reasons to burn down the corn field, 
even if engaging in such conduct infringes the elements of the offense of 
                                                 
75 The conduct does not satisfy neither the elements of the offense of arson nor 
criminal mischief, for both of these offenses require that the property that is destroyed 
(criminal mischief) or set in fire (arson) belong to another.  
76 Gardner, supra note 9, at 822. 
 Why is it a Crime to Stomp on a Goldfish? 57 
arson.  
It should be noted, however, that the fact that justifications provide us 
with good reasons for engaging in the conduct does not mean that the 
reasons that the offense provides against performing the conduct magically 
disappear.77 Thus, it has been stated that:  
When someone pleads a justification, she is claiming that the reasons in 
favour of doing as she did stand undefeated by the reasons against. The 
reasons against are those that make what she did an offence. They have 
not gone away. They still make it an offence. But the reasons in 
favour prevail and make it a justified offence (and hence one of which 
she should be acquitted) 78 
 
Since the reasons that the offense provides for abstaining to engage in 
the act are not swept away by the existence of justificatory circumstances, 
some “residual” reasons for not performing the conduct remain even if the 
act is ultimately justified. Consequently, although necessity provides Randy 
with good reasons for burning down Sasha’s corn field, the fact that doing 
so infringes the elements of the offense of arson still provides us with some 
residual reasons against performing the justified conduct. However, given 
that these residual reasons (saving the corn field) are not of sufficient force 
to outweigh the reasons in favor of engaging in the conduct that the 
existence of justificatory circumstances provide (saving three homes), 
burning down Sasha’s corn field in such a case cannot be considered 
                                                 
77 Kenneth Campbell, Offence and Defence, in Criminal Law and Justice: Essays from 
the W.G. Hart Workshop, 1986, at 83 (I.H. Dennis ed., Sweet & Maxwell 1987). 
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criminal.  
 
c. REGRETTABLE VS. NON-REGRETTABLE LAWFUL ACTS 
 
While the existence of residual reasons against performing an act that is 
constitutive of an offense does not afford us with sufficient grounds to 
criminalize the conduct if it is justified, they do provide us with sound 
reasons to feel regret for having engaged in the conduct. We have cause to 
regret the conduct because, all things being considered, “[i]t would have 
been better still had there been no occasion to commit [the act], and hence 
no need to ask whether its commission was justified or not.”79 Therefore, 
justified conduct, although lawful, is regrettable, for the harm that the 
infraction of the elements of the offense represents is not wiped away 
merely by the existence of justificatory circumstances.  
In a recent article, Professors Michelle Dempsey and Jonathan Herring 
convincingly argued both that instances of “justified prima facie 
wrongdoing leav[e] a moral residue of regret” and that the regret thus 
produced has significant “rational force”.80 This regret has rational force 
because it generates legal reasons “to prefer less wrongful alternatives to 
securing the values that justify the prima facie wrongful conduct”.81 
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Suppose, for example, that the law does not impose a duty to retreat as a 
prerequisite to the use of justifiable force in self-defense. Thus, according to 
the law in this jurisdiction, Sandra could justifiably kill Laura in order to 
repel her unlawful deadly attack, even if she could have avoided injury by 
retreating to a safe place. However, since the act of killing Laura satisfies 
the elements of the offense of homicide, Sandra has good reasons (saving 
Laura’s life) for abstaining to engage in the justifiable conduct. Although 
the reasons against engaging in the conduct that the offense represents are 
not of sufficient weight to make Sandra’s justifiable use of deadly force 
criminal, they do provide her with motives to regret killing Laura. 
Furthermore, these residual “regret-causing motives” afford Sandra with 
reasons to attempt to avert the unlawful attack by retreating, although it 
would not be criminal for her to decide to repel the attack by killing Laura 
in self-defense. Curiously, the same reasons that the offense provides us 
against killing Laura in self-defense in the first place – the protection of 
human life -  are the reasons that counsel in favor of attempting to avert the 
attack by less harmful alternatives.82    
                                                 
82 Dempsey and Herring illustrate the rational force of regret by way of the following 
example: 
 
Surgical cutting into a patient's body is a prima facie wrong, but one that may be 
justified in virtue of reasons generated inter alia by the value of the patient's life and 
well-being. Despite its justification, however, cutting into a patient's body is still to be 
regretted. This regret generates reasons for medical personnel to seek less wrongful 
alternatives to securing the values sought by the surgery. If, for example, the purpose 
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Contrarily, acts that do not satisfy the elements of an offense do not 
generate reasons to regret having engaged in the conduct. As a result, a 
person who engages in conduct that does not constitute an offense has no 
reasons for seeking less injurious alternatives for achieving whatever it is 
that he aims to attain by performing the act. Therefore, the law does not 
afford someone who shoots at a piece of paper reasons to feel regret for 
having engaged in the conduct. This, in turn, entails that there is no reason 
for a person to attempt to make use of other less harmful means in order to 
achieve whatever it is that they aim to accomplish by shooting at the piece 
of paper (target practice, for example). 
 
3. THE SUPRA-STATUTORY  NATURE OF THE OFFENSE/JUSTIFICATION 
DISTINCTION 
 
On some occasions, the positive law clearly distinguishes between 
offenses and justifications. This is typically the case with regards to the 
conduct that is regulated in the comprehensive penal codes of most 
jurisdictions. Usually, criminal codes are divided into a “special part” and a 
“general part”. The special part contains the offenses whose commission is 
regarded as prima facie wrongful. The general part, on the other hand, 
                                                                                                                            
of the cutting is to perform exploratory surgery in hopes of diagnosing a source of the 
patient's abdominal pain, it is rationally incumbent upon the surgeon to seek less 
wrongful alternatives to diagnosing the source of the pain before cutting into the 
patient's body.  
Id., at 488-489.  
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contains a series of general doctrines of criminal responsibility that, in 
principle, apply to every instance of commission of an offense.83 It is here 
where one can typically find provisions that deal with the exculpatory 
dimension of criminal offenses and, consequently, with justification 
defenses. 
Since the special part of penal codes contains a long list of offenses and 
the general part usually contains a catalogue of justification defenses (self-
defense, necessity, law enforcement duties, etc), the offense/justification 
distinction is often clearly reflected in the statutory law of any given 
jurisdiction. The New York Penal Law, for example, distinguishes between 
“general provisions” (i.e. the “general part”) and “specific offenses” (i.e. the 
“special part”).84 Thus, the list of acts that are deemed to be prima facie 
illegal are regulated in the “specific offenses” part of the Penal Law, 
whereas the justificatory circumstances that allow us to engage in what 
would otherwise constitute an unlawful act are specified in the “general 
provisions” section of the statute. Such an organizational structure of penal 
laws typically makes it easier for us to differentiate between offenses and 
justifications.  An examination of New York law reveals, for example, that 
                                                 
83 Thus, the general part of many criminal codes contain provisions with regards to 
basic doctrines of criminal law, such as the “act requirement”, the forms of culpability (i.e. 
intent and negligence), attempt liability, perpetration and complicity, etc. See, generally, 
FLETCHER, supra note 40, at 393-395.  
84 New York Penal Law contains an additional part (Part II) that is intended to regulate 
sentencing practices.  
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whoever kills a human being in self-defense has committed the offense of 
homicide.85  Given that this conduct is constitutive of an offense, we have 
sound reasons against engaging in the act. In spite of this, the use of force in 
self-defense is not criminal pursuant to New York law because it is 
justified.86 Thus, although the fact that such conduct infringes the elements 
of an offense provides us with reasons to abstain from engaging in the act, 
the existence of justificatory circumstances would make such conduct one 
that is, on balance, not wrongful. 
Unfortunately, legislative appearances can sometimes be deceiving, for 
criminal statutes do not always differentiate in a clear way between conduct 
that is not wrongful because it does not satisfy the elements of an offense 
and acts that are legal because they are justified. The California Penal Code 
provision defining the crime of murder constitutes a chief example. 
According to the Code, murder is “the unlawful killing of a human 
being…with malice aforethought”.87 What makes this provision 
problematic is that it infelicitously conflates the inculpatory and exculpatory 
dimensions of the crime by specifying that murder is an “unlawful killing”. 
Since justified killings are, by definition, lawful, it follows that deaths that 
are produced as a result of the justifiable use of force do not satisfy 
California’s definition of murder. Thus, at first glance, one might be 
                                                 
85 §125.00 N.Y. Penal Law.  
86 §35.15 N.Y. Penal Law. 
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tempted to conclude that, at least in California, causing the death of a 
person in self-defense is lawful because it does not satisfy the elements of 
an offense. Therefore, it might be argued that a person who kills another in 
self-defense has committed no prima-facie wrong that is in need of 
justification.88     
  Although seductive, this understanding of the offense/justification 
distinction is either wrong or profoundly unilluminating. If the distinction is 
to be of any consequence, “offenses” and “justifications” ought to be 
understood as conceptual categories that help us to better appreciate the 
general structure of punishable crimes, not as labels that can be legislatively 
defined in such a way that distinguishing between these categories would be 
a worthless endeavor. The reason why I  have paid so much attention to the 
offense/justification dichotomy in this article is because I believe that we 
can learn something about the law, morality and society by understanding 
the distinction. Thus, by making use of the terms “offense” and 
“justification”, I am making broad claims about the nature and structure of 
punishable crimes in our society, not about the particular way in which the 
                                                                                                                            
87 §187 Cal. Penal Code.  
88 According to this reading, justifications (i.e. self-defense) would constitute negative 
elements of the offense, rather than independent defenses that exclude the wrongfulness of 
the conduct without negating the elements of the offense. Some European scholars 
maintain that this is the best way to interpret criminal statutes. See, for example, DIEGO 
MANUEL LUZÓN PEÑA, CURSO DE DERECHO PENAL PARTE GENERAL 302-303 (Universitas, 
1996). This position, however, has been convincingly criticized by numerous scholars. See, 
generally, FRANCISCO MUÑOZ CONDE & MERCEDES GARCÍA ARÁN, DERECHO PENAL 
PARTE GENERAL 252-253 (Tirant Lo Blanch, 2004).  
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legislature of California (sloppily) drafted their murder statute (or any other 
criminal statute).   
Therefore, it is clear that the offense/justification distinction that I am 
referring to is supra-statutory in nature. According to this understanding of 
the distinction, which is widely shared by criminal theorists and legal 
philosophers, the way in which a statute has been drafted is not 
determinative when ascertaining whether conduct should be considered 
lawful because it is not constitutive of an “offense” or because it is 
“justified”.89  
Since the statutory formulations of crimes can sometimes be misleading, 
it is necessary to elaborate supra-statutory standards that allow us to 
distinguish between conduct that is lawful because it does not satisfy the 
elements of an offense and conduct that is lawful because it is justified. In 
my opinion, this can be accomplished by appealing to the ideas that 
undergird the different ways of understanding the offense/justification 
distinction that have been elaborated in this section.  
Previously, I attempted to demonstrate the communicative significance 
of the “offense” and “justification” categories by appealing to three 
                                                 
89 This view was forcefully defended by the leading German criminal theorist Hans 
Welzel, who stated that whether the legislature decides to incorporate the criteria of 
justification into the definition of a crime is “irrelevant” to distinguishing between the 
offense and the justification. WELZEL, supra note 72, at 96 (asserting that “even if self-
defense were to be included [as part of the definition of the crime of homicide]…the non-
existence of the defense would not be transformed into a “negative” element of the 
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different notions – harmful vs. non-harmful lawful acts, reasons against and 
reasons in favor of perfoming an act, and regrettable vs. non-regrettable 
lawful conduct. I believe that these notions can also serve as heuristic 
devices that aid us in the sometimes difficult endeavor of distinguishing 
between offenses and justifications, particularly when the statutory law does 
not provide much guidance.  
Thus, regardless of how the legislature decides to draft their criminal 
statutes, a promising way of distinguishing between different types of non-
wrongful acts is by asking ourselves the following questions:  
(1) The conduct is lawful because: (a) no harm has been caused, 
or (b)  although harm has been caused, the benefits caused 
by the act outweigh the harm produced by the conduct. 
    
(2) The conduct is lawful because: (a) we have no reasons to 
refrain from performing it, or (b) although there are reasons 
against engaging in the conduct, they are outweighed by 
reasons in favor of performing the act. 
  
(3) Do we have reasons to attempt to make use of other less 
harmful means in order to achieve what we aimed to 
accomplish by engaging in the lawful act? (a) no, because 
there are no reasons to regret having engaged in the act, or 
(b) yes, because there are reasons to regret having engaged in 
the act.  
 
If the answer to the three questions is (a), then the conduct is lawful 
because it does not satisfy the elements of an offense. Contrarily, if the 
answer to these questions is (b), then the conduct is legal because it is 
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justified.  
These questions provide us guidance when determining whether a 
killing in self-defense is not wrongful because it doesn’t satisfy the 
elements of an offense or because it is justified. As was previously stated, 
the California murder provision suggests that such killings are lawful 
because they do not satisfy the elements of an offense. This conclusion, 
however, is mistaken, given that: 
(1) The conduct is lawful because, although harm has been caused 
(death of the aggressor), the evil wreaked by the act is outweighed 
by the evil avoided by the conduct (death of person unlawfully 
attacked). 
 
(2) The conduct is lawful because, although there are reasons against 
engaging in the conduct (protecting the life of the aggressor), they 
are outweighed by reasons in favor of performing the act (protecting 
the life of the person attacked). 
 
(3) We have legal reasons to attempt to make use of other less harmful 
means in order to achieve what we aimed to accomplish by killing 
the aggressor in self-defense (by retreating, for example),  because 
there are reasons to regret having killed the aggressor. 
 
 
C. THE STRUCTURE OF ANTI-CRUELTY OFFENSES 
 
1. THE AMBIGUITY OF ANIMAL CRUELTY LAWS 
 
Now that we have explored the general structure of punishable crimes, 
we are in a better position to understand the particular structure of anti-
cruelty statutes. Anti cruelty laws, like other criminal statutes, have an 
inculpatory and exulpatory dimension. Thus, a reading of these laws reveals 
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that they purport to both describe conduct that society considers to be prima 
facie wrongful and to illustrate circumstances in which engaging in such 
conduct is, all things being considered, non-wrongful. In other words, anti-
cruelty statutes contain both definitions of offenses and a catalogue of 
justifications. The problem, as anyone who has read up to this point would 
suspect, is that these laws do not clearly differentiate between conduct that 
is not wrongful because it doesn’t satisfy the elements of the offense and 
acts that are lawful because they are justified.  
Take, for example, the Montana anti-cruelty statute. This law 
criminalizes a variety of acts, such as “injuring” or “killing” an animal.90 
However, it also states that “nothing in this section prohibits [injuring or 
killing an animal as result of] commonly accepted 
agricultural…practices”.91 The combined effect of these two provisions is 
unclear. There are a couple of plausible interpretations of this statute: 
(1) Injuring or killing an animal as a result of lawful agricultural 
practices is not prohibited (i.e. is “lawful”) because doing so 
does not satisfy the elements of an offense, or 
 
(2) Injuring or killing an animal as a result of lawful agricultural 
practices is not prohibited because, although doing so satisfies 
the elements of an offense, it is justified.  
 
 
The Texas anti-cruelty statute is plagued by a similar ambiguity. 
Pursuant to said law, intentionally “killing”, “torturing” or “seriously 
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injuring” an animal is a crime.92 However, “it is a defense to 
prosecution…that the actor [harmed the animal as a result of being] 
engaged in bona fide…scientific research”.93 Once again, there are two 
possible interpretations of this statute: 
(1) Injuring or killing an animal as a result of bona fide scientific 
experimentation is not prohibited  because doing so does not 
satisfy the elements of an offense, or 
 
(2) Injuring or killing an animal as a result of bona fide scientific 
experimentation is not prohibited  because doing so is justified.  
 
How should we determine which of the plausible readings of the Texas and 
Montana94 statutes represents the best interpretation of animal cruelty 
laws?95   
 One possible way to tackle this matter would be to look for answers by 
parsing the statutory text. Some might believe, for example, that the fact 
that the Texas statute states that “it is a defense” to prosecution that the 
harm was caused as a result of scientific experimentation implies that this 
                                                                                                                            
90 MT. ST. 45-8-211(1)(a).  
91 MT. ST. 45-8-211(4)(b). 
92 Tex. Penal Code Ann. §42.09(a)(1) & (a)(5).  
93 Tex. Penal Code Ann. §42.09(b). 
94 Since the Montana and Texas anti-cruelty statutes are representative of most animal 
cruelty laws in the United States, I will not provide additional examples of the problems of 
interpretation that these statutes entail. 
95 Someone might argue that the answer to this question is of little significance, for, in 
any case, the aforementioned conduct is lawful regardless of whether it doesn’t constitute 
an offense or is justified. This fails to grasp the communicative significance of the 
offense/justification distinction. It surely is not trivial whether society considers that 
injuring an animal as a result of scientific or agricultural practices has more in common 
with the act of shooting at a piece of paper (conduct that does not constitute an offense) 
than with the act of shooting a person in self-defense (justifiable conduct). Therefore, it 
seems to me that an answer to this question is warranted. 
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type of conduct is justified, for justifications are defenses to crimes.  
Furtheremore, it might be argued that since the Montana statute asserts that 
“nothing in this section prohibits” injuring animals as a result of agricultural 
practices, engaging in such conduct does not even satisfy the elements of 
the offense.  
This type of analysis strikes me as formalistic and unenlightening. It is 
clear that these statutes purport to exclude certain activities that are harmful 
to animals (scientific experiments and agricultural practices) from the reach 
of the criminal law. I do not believe, however, that much should be read 
into the specific way in which legislatures have drafted such exceptions. 
Whether the statute declares the lawfulness of such conduct by asserting 
that it “is a defense to the crime” or by claiming that the act is “not 
prohibited” by the law is immaterial to the question about whether the 
legality of the conduct stems from the fact that it is not constitutive of an 
offense or from its justifiable nature.  
Since the offense/justification distinction is supra-statutory in nature, I 
believe that a more satisfying an answer to the aforementioned question can 
be obtained by appealing to the heuristic devices that I have described in the 
previous sub-section. It is to this matter that I now turn.  
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2. HARM, REASONS AND REGRET IN ANTI-CRUELTY STATUTES 
 
a. HARMFUL LEGAL ACTS AND ANTI-CUELTY STATUTES 
 
By now it should be clear that there is a difference between non-harmful 
and harmful legal acts. Conduct that does not satisfy the elements of an 
offense does not typically cause harm (i.e. shooting at a piece of paper). 
However, justified conduct usually causes harm, although the harm avoided 
by engaging in the act is greater than the one inflicted (shooting at a person 
in self-defense). Thus, the first question that one should ask when 
examining the nature of the exemption of punishment that is afforded to 
those who injure animals pursuant to scientific or agricultural practices is 
whether those acts are lawful because they do not cause harm or because the 
harm that they inflict is outweighed by the benefits that are reaped by 
engaging in the conduct. The following examples might help us to answer 
this question. 
(1) Judy decides to dislocate a rabbit’s neck because she enjoys 
seeing animals suffer. 
  
(2) Judy decides to dislocate a a rabbit’s neck pursuant to a bona 
fide scientific experiment.  
 
(3) Judy decides to dislocate a rabbit’s neck in order to slaughter the 
creature and sell it in a commercial establishment pursuant to 
local laws.  
 
The conduct in example number (1) is clearly criminal under most, if 
not all, modern anti-cruelty statutes. Thus, the harm that is caused to the 
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rabbit is most certainly relevant for the criminal law. The conduct in 
example (2), on the other hand, is undoubtedly lawful under the traditional 
animal cruelty statute. It would be mistaken, however, to believe that the 
legality of such conduct stems from the fact that the harm caused to the 
rabbit is legally irrelevant. As example (1) demonstrates, the infliction of 
harm to rabbits matters for the criminal law. It would thus be odd to assume 
that the fact that the rabbit is injured pursuant to a bona fide scientific 
acticvity magically erases the harm caused to the creature.  
Consequently, it makes better sense to conclude that the exemption from 
punishment afforded in example (2) is the product of a determination that 
the conduct is lawful because the harm endured by the animal is outweighed 
by the potential benefits of engaging in the scientific experimentation. Of 
course, one might disagree with the relative value that the law assigns to the 
interests in conflict in such cases. Many, including myself, believe that the 
harm caused to the rabbit should be given much more weight than what is 
currently the case. However, this disagreement does not prove that the 
injury caused to the rabbit in such cases does not “count” as harm for the 
criminal law. It merely demonstrates that such harm does not “count” as 
much as I, and most animal law scholars, believe that it should.  
The conduct in example (3) should be treated in much the same way as 
the act in example (2). There is nothing magical about food production that 
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makes the harm caused to the rabbit in example (3) any different from the 
harm caused to the animal in example (1). The harm caused in both cases is 
identical: the dislocation of a rabbit’s neck. The infliction of this harm, qua 
harm, remains unwelcome. However, the conduct in example (3) is lawful 
because the benefits generated by the act (production of food) is deemed to 
outweigh the harm caused to the animal. 
   An examination of these hypotheticals reveals that the reason why 
injuring an animal pursuant to agricultural or scientific acitivities is lawful 
is not because doing so does not constitute an offense, for such acts harm an 
interest protected by the criminal law. These acts are legal because they are 
justified, for, even though the harm that they cause matters for the criminal 
law, it is (rightly or wrongly) outweighed by countervailing considerations.  
b. “REASONS” AND ANTI-CRUELTY STATUTES 
 
Another way of probing the structure of animal cruelty statutes is by 
examining whether those that harm animals pursuant to certain enumerated 
activities act lawfully because there are no reasons for prohibiting such 
conduct or because, despite there being reasons against performing such 
acts, they are counterbalanced by the reasons that we have in favor of 
engaging in the conduct. If the former explanation for the lawfulness of the 
conduct is accurate (there are no reasons against performing the act), then it 
should be concluded that the causation of harm to animals as a result of 
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scientific or agricultural activities is not constitutive of an offense. 
However, if the latter explanation for the non-wrongfulness of the conduct 
is correct (reasons in favor of performing the act outweigh reasons against), 
then engaging in such acts is lawful because it is justified. An examination 
of the examples put forth in the previous sub-section is once again useful to 
a discussion of these matters.  
   I believe that example (1) demonstrates that animal cruelty statutes 
provide us with reasons against injuring animals. If Judy were to ask Andy 
whether she should dislocate a rabbit’s neck, Andy would be able to point 
out that anti cruelty statutes give her good reasons to abstain from doing so. 
In other words, such statutes provide us with prima facie reasons against 
injuring an animal. On the other hand, examples (2) and (3) show that 
animal cruelty statutes also provide us with reasons in favor of harming 
animals (scientific experiments and food production) that might outweigh 
the prima facie reasons that the law affords against engaging in such 
conduct (keeping animals free from harm).  
It should be noted, however, that it invites confusion to state that the 
presence of reasons in favor of performing the conduct wipe away the 
reasons against engaging in the act. Asserting that the law provides no 
reasons against dislocating a rabbit’s neck if such harm takes place as a 
result of scientific experimentation or food processing practices would be 
74 Why is it a Crime to Stomp on a Goldfish?  
misleading. It makes better sense to conclude that, despite the fact that we 
have good reasons not to dislocate a rabbit’s neck, those reasons are 
outweighed if the injuries occur pursuant to certain lawful activities.      
These reflections corroborate that engaging in conduct that falls within 
the purview of the exceptions that plague anti-cruelty statutes is lawful 
because it is justified, not because it is not constitutive of an offense. 
Consequently, although the law affords Judy with valid grounds to injure an 
animal pursuant to scientific or food processing activities, the fact that 
doing so is constitutive of an offense still provides her with residual reasons 
against performing the justified conduct. However, given that these residual 
reasons (keeping the animal free from harm) are not of sufficient weight to 
counterbalance the reasons in favor of engaging in the act that the presence 
of justificatory circumstances provide (scientific advancement, food 
processing), dislocating the rabbit’s neck is considered legal in such 
circumstances. 
c. REGRET AND ANTI-CRUELTY STATUTES 
 
The residual reasons that remain against harming an animal even in 
circumstances when doing so would be justified pursuant to some lawful 
activity provide us with sufficient motives to regret having had to cause the 
harm, even if doing so was justifiable. The rational force of such regret 
should lead us to seek other less harmful alternatives to achieving the ends 
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that we aimed to accomplish by injuring the animal.  
Thus, Judy should first attempt to obtain whatever knowledge she 
wishes to attain by injuring the rabbit by engaging in scientific experiments 
that do not involve harm to animals. I think that this belief is shared by most 
people. Even if the majority of the population believes that it is justifiable to 
harm animals in order to advance science, many people are disturbed by the 
suffering that such activities cause to animals. The bulk of the populace 
regrets the harm that is inflicted to these animals and would thus prefer that, 
if possible, other less injurious alternatives be used in order to achieve 
scientific advancement.  Similarly, we have reason to regret harming 
animals pursuant to food processing activities. As a result, most people 
would probably prefer that those in charge of engaging in such activities 
seek the least harmful methods to achieve the desired end.   
 The fact that we have good reason to regret harming animals 
pursuant to scientific and agricultural activities buttresses the conclusion 
that engaging in such conduct is lawful because it is justified, not because it 
does not satisfy the elements of an offense. As I have stated before, conduct 
that is lawful because it does not satisfy the elements of an offense 
(shooting at a piece of paper) is typically not regrettable. However, conduct 
that is lawful because it is justified (shooting a person in self-defense) is 
generally regrettable. Thus, it makes more sense to conclude that injuring an 
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animal in order to advance scientific knowledge or to produce food has 
more in common with the act of shooting at a person in self-defense than 
with the act of shooting at a piece of paper.  
As has been demonstrated, both the acts of harming an animal pursuant 
to one of these activities and of shooting a person in self-defense inflict 
harm that is relevant for the criminal law. Furthermore, they are lawful 
because the reasons in favor of engaging in the act outweigh the reasons 
against performing the conduct, not because there are no reasons to abstain 
from engaging in the act in the first place. As a result, we have reason to 
regret both harming animals and shooting at human beings, even if doing so 
would be justifiable. This, in turn, generates reasons that should lead us to 
seek less injurious alternatives to attain the end that we would accomplish 
by engaging in the justified conduct.  
The following table summarizes the conclusions that have been 
advanced up to this point: 
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Table 1. The Structure and Communicative Meaning of Anti-Cruelty 
Statutes 
 
The 
Categories 
The Act-Descrpition The Communicative Significance 
The Offense Causing injury to a 
non-human animal 
A person who infringes the offense 
has: 
1. harmed an interest that the 
criminal law seeks to protect 
2. performed conduct that is, all 
things being equal, wrongful 
3. engaged in conduct that we have 
reasons to refrain from performing 
4. performed conduct that we have 
reason to regret 
The 
Justifications 
1. Bona fide 
Scientific 
Experimentation, 
 
2. Farming, 
Agricultural and 
Food Processing 
Practices, 
 
3. Hunting, Fishing, 
and Trapping 
Practices 
 
4. Pest Control, 
 
5. Others.  
A person who justifiably infringes 
the offense has: 
1. harmed an interest that the 
criminal law seeks to protect, but 
the harmed caused is outweighed 
by the benefits generated by the 
conduct,  
2. performed conduct that is, all 
things being considered, not 
wrongful, 
3. reasons for engaging in the 
conduct that outweigh the reasons 
against performing the act,  
4. performed lawful conduct that 
we nevertheless have reason to 
regret  
 
 
 
D. WHY THE ANIMAL LAW SCHOLAR’S CLAIM IS WRONG  
 
An understanding of the conceptual structure of anti-cruelty offenses 
reveals that the interpretation of such laws typically afforded by animal law 
scholars is misguided. Once one differentiates between the inculpatory (the 
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offense) and exculpatory (the justifications) dimensions of these laws, one 
can see why it is not true that, as Professor Bryant has argued, the harm 
caused to animals as a result of the activities that are exempted from 
punishment under the typical anti-cruelty statute “simply doesn't count in 
legal terms”. 
As has been argued, acts that are considered lawful pursuant to one of 
these exemptions remain harmful even though they are justified. It is thus 
mistaken to conclude that the harm inflicted to animals pursuant to 
justifiable activities does not “count” as legally relevant harm.  The 
presence of justificatory circumstances (advancement of agricultural or 
scientific activities) does not wipe away the harm caused by the conduct.   
What these exemptions truly reveal is that there are countervailing reasons 
that society considers to be of sufficient weight to justify engaging in prima 
facie wrongful conduct that causes harm to animals, not that the offense was 
not designed to protect animals in the first place. Therefore, the thesis 
advanced in this article – that the chief reason why we create anti-cruelty 
offenses is to protect animals from the infliction of harm – is not 
incompatible with the exemptions contemplated in the typical animal 
cruelty statute.  
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E. WHY ALL OF THIS SHOULD MATTER TO AN ANIMAL RIGHTS ACTIVIST 
 
Up to this point, I have attempted to demonstrate that the interpretation 
that many animal law scholars have made of the exemptions that plague anti 
cruelty statutes is misguided because it conflates the inculpatory and 
exculpatory dimensions of such laws. I will now (very) briefly sketch why 
such an interpretation is also objectionable on pragmatic grounds.  
The reading of anti cruelty statutes that I have criticized here is probably 
the product of the fundamental disagreement that many animal law scholars 
have with the myriad reasons that such laws provide as justifications for 
infringing the offense. For them, the fact that the exemptions that plague 
these statutes leaves an inordinate number of acts that are harmful to 
animals unpunished demonstrates that the real purpose of these laws is to 
protect human activities that cannot be accomplished without injuring 
animals.  
Although I am also outraged by many of the justifications that these 
statutes provide for inflicting harm to animals, I believe that those who 
defend the position that I have attempted to debunk here have failed to 
understand what seems intuitively obvious to most people – that society has 
called for the creation of anti-cruelty offenses as a way of protecting 
animals, not as a vehicle for perpetuating the exploitation of such 
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creatures.96 In my opinion, it is a strategic blunder to ignore that, as Jerrold 
Tannenbaum has correctly pointed out, people “virtually universally” accept 
the proposition that “the primary purpose of [anti-cruelty] laws is to protect 
animals”97 Thus, instead of decrying statutes that criminalize animal abuse 
as another example of how animals are treated as “fungible” and 
“disposable” goods,98 we should argue against the existence of the many 
exemptions that plague such laws by tapping into the basic sentiment that 
has led people to call for the enactment of anti-cruelty statutes in the first 
place.          
CONCLUSIONS 
 
A. STATUTES CRIMINALIZING HARMFUL CONDUCT AGAINST ANIMALS DO 
NOT PRIMARILY SEEK TO PROTECT PROPERTY INTERESTS 
 
The conclusion that anti-cruelty statutes do not primarily seek to 
further property interests will strike some as provocative. Many, if not most, 
animal law scholars have accepted Professor Francione’s contention that “as 
far as the law is concerned, animals are nothing more than commodities”.99 
Thus, the proposition that animals are for all relevant legal purposes treated 
as property is generally accepted.  
While this might very well be the case in the non-criminal context, it 
                                                 
96 Robert Garner, Animal Welfare: A Political Defense, 1 Journal of Animal Law and 
Ethics 161, 171-172 (2006).  
97 Jerrold Tannenbaum, Animals and the Law: Property, Cruelty, Rights, 62 Soc. Res. 
539, 580 (1995). 
98 Bryant, supra note 66, at 76.  
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doesn’t ring true as far as the penal law is concerned. Although a property-
based conception of anti-cruelty statutes prevailed during much of the 19th 
Century, since then there has been an irreversible trend towards 
criminalizing animal abuse regardless of questions of property. Under 
modern animal cruelty statutes, pet owners are generally not free to harm 
their animals. Furthermore, they typically cannot consent to letting their 
animals being harmed by someone else. These propositions are at odds with 
a property-based conception of such laws. 
Some believe that the only way of giving to animals the protection 
that they deserve lies in changing their legal status from property to persons. 
In an attempt to convince people that this shift in the juridical status of 
animals is necessary, scholars have traditionally appealed to extra-legal 
philosophical arguments. While these theoretical avenues are certainly 
worth pursuing, I believe that the seeds of the “personhood” of animals can 
already be found in modern animal cruelty laws. As far as anti-cruelty 
statutes are concerned, animals are being treated like persons in a very 
important way—they qualify as victims worthy of being protected by the 
criminal laws irrespective of their property status in the non-criminal law 
context. 
 
                                                                                                                            
99 Francione, supra note 45.  
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B. HARM TO ANIMALS IS NOT CRIMINALIZED PRIMARILY AS A MEANS OF 
ENFORCING MORALITY 
 
A second conclusion that can be drawn from the foregoing discussion is 
that, although mistreating animals is certainly immoral, it should not be 
contended that this is the principal reason for criminalizing the conduct. If 
there is one thing that the venerable harm principle stands for, it is the fact 
that an act should not be proscribed solely because it is deemed to be 
contrary to a moral principle. This contention is both compatible with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence and with the position held by most 
criminal law theorists. 
C. CRIMINAL STATUTES THAT PROHIBIT HARM TO ANIMALS PRIMARILY 
SEEK TO PROTECT ANIMALS FROM BEING HARMED 
 
The view that animal cruelty statutes seek to prevent harm to animals is 
both normatively appealing and descriptively illuminating. From a 
normative viewpoint, conferring legal protection to non-human sentient 
beings is a welcome development. If we can all agree that experiencing pain 
is something worth avoiding and that non-human animals have the capacity 
to be cognizant of such feelings, it follows that we should also protect them 
from the unjustifiable infliction of suffering. 
 From a descriptive standpoint it is also preferable to conceive anti-
cruelty statutes as laws that are designed to prevent harm to animals. Both 
domestically and internationally, governments are banning activities that 
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cause harm to animals despite the fact that their performance sometimes 
commands considerable support from the populace. Thus, all state 
jurisdictions in the United States have criminalized dog and cock fighting 
over the objections of many. Similarly, bullfighting is banned in several 
countries once associated with the Spanish crown despite its rich historical 
roots.100 These recent trends in anti-cruelty legislation are difficult to 
explain unless one believes that the chief purpose of criminalizing animal 
abuse is to prevent the unjustifiable suffering of animals. No alternative 
conception of animal cruelty laws comes close to explaining this 
increasingly important aspect of anti-cruelty legislation. 
This does not necessarily mean, however, that anti-cruelty statutes were 
enacted solely for the purpose of protecting animals from harm. 
Undoubtedly, these laws, like many other criminal statutes (i.e. rape and 
murder statutes), also exist in partial recognition of the fact that most people 
consider that engaging in the prohibited conduct is morally reprehensible. 
Furthermore, it is likely that the decision to criminalize cruelty to animals 
was motivated to some extent by an interest in curbing future harm to 
humans and in preventing emotional pain to those with close ties to the 
creatures harmed. It might also be argued that some features of animal 
cruelty laws promote the preservation of certain property interests. 
                                                 
100 In Latin America, bullfighting has been banned in Uruguay, Argentina, Chile and 
Cuba. 
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Nevertheless, I believe that the conclusion that the primary purpose of 
animal cruelty statutes is to protect animals from harm is inescapable. This 
conclusion is not contradicted by the fact that these laws contain 
exemptions that allow for the causation of harm to animals pursuant to 
certain lawful activities (scientific experimentation, agriculture, hunting, 
etc). An examination of the structure of anti-cruelty statutes reveals that the 
exempted activities promote interests that justify inflicting suffering on 
animals, not that laws criminalizing animal abuse were not designed to 
protect the creatures in the first place. 
D. PEOPLE V GARCIA: A SECOND LOOK 
 
 
Once it is understood that the principal purpose of anti-cruelty statutes 
is to prevent injury to animals, one can see why the decision in People v. 
Garcia cannot withstand close scrutiny. The court asked all of the wrong 
questions because it seemed to conceive animal cruelty statutes as laws that 
are designed either to prevent future harm to humans or to prevent 
emotional harm to those with close ties to the animal abused. The former 
conceptualization of animal cruelty statutes led the court to focus on the 
state of mind of the perpetrator in order to determine whether his act 
evinced a heightened level of cruelty. The latter characterization led the 
court to focus on the emotional harm caused to the custodian of the pet. 
By misapprehending the nature and purpose of anti-cruelty statutes, the 
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court gave short thrift to the only being whose interests were sought to be 
protected by such legislation –the animal harmed- in this case, Junior the 
goldfish. Therefore, the question that should have been asked in Garcia is 
whether the instantaneous killing of a goldfish by stomping on him 
constitutes an act of simple or aggravated cruelty. The decisive 
consideration should thus be the amount of pain and suffering endured by 
the fish. As the amount of pain inflicted increases, the arguments in favor of 
considering the act to be one of aggravated cruelty get stronger. Contrarily, 
as the amount of pain and suffering decreases, the case in favor of a finding 
of aggravated cruelty weakens.   
Reasonable minds might disagree with regards to whether the suffering 
endured by Junior was of such a degree to warrant a determination of 
aggravated cruelty. On the one hand, the defendant’s contention that the fish 
did not suffer because he was killed instantly seems to point in the direction 
of not considering this act to be one of extreme cruelty. On the other hand, 
it might be argued that the killing of a being constitutes the supreme act of 
cruelty. If that were the case, a finding of aggravated cruelty would be 
warranted. 
Regardless of whether one believes that the defendant should have 
prevailed in his arguments, there is little doubt with regards to who was the 
real victim of the Court’s analysis in Garcia –a little goldfish named Junior.  
